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The automatic generation of an explanation of the prescription made by a multi-attribute
decision model is crucial in many applications, such as recommender systems. This task is
complex since the quantitative models are not designed to be easily explainable. The major
limitation of the previous research is that there is no formal justiﬁcation of the arguments
that are selected in the explanation. The goal of this paper is to deﬁne a general framework
to justify which arguments shall be selected, in the case where the decision model is based
on weights assigned to the attributes. Due to the complexity of explaining a preference
model based on utility theory, several explanation reasonings are necessary to cover all
cases – ranging from situations where the prescription is trivial to situations where the
prescription is much more tight. The set of selected arguments is, in this framework, a
non-dominated element of a combinatorial structure in the sense of an order relation.
Our general approach is instantiated precisely on three models: the probabilistic expected
utility model, the qualitative pessimistic minmax model and the concordance rule, which
are all constructed from a weight vector.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In decision making under uncertainty, social choice and multi-criteria decision making, which are the three main domains
of decision theory [40,48], explicit analytical models are constructed to represent the preferences of a decision maker
regarding how to combine various dimensions, which are the states of nature, the voters and the criteria respectively.
Decision theory mainly focuses on specifying how a rational agent should behave, which results in the justiﬁcation, through
axiomatic characterizations, of the decision models that should be used [54,51,37,41]. Another well-developed research
area in decision theory concerns the elicitation of the decision maker preferences, and has led to the design of elaborate
elicitation methods.
Decision models are traditionally mainly quantitative, which is the case for instance of the expected utility model [54,
51]. More recently, qualitative models have been developed in AI in order to overcome the diﬃculty of the elicitation of the
information necessary for these models [24,19,12,20]. A wide class of quantitative and qualitative models are parameterized
by a weight vector where a weight is assigned to each dimension [26,49]. We are interested in these models in this paper.
The ﬁnal part of the decision process, after the model has been elicited, is usually not studied in decision theory. It is
generally reduced to the application of the decision model on the options of interest. If an individual constructs his decision
model and is convinced about its relevance, then it is not necessary to explain to him the result of the application of the
decision model. However there are many practical situations in which the decision needs to be justiﬁed to some actors
who did not participate to its construction. These actors are not interested in the technicality of the decision model. On the
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[35], such an explanation should be intuitive, comprehensive and persuasive.
The automatic generation of an explanation of the outcome of a decision model is not an easy task since the models
from decision theory are not designed to provide the reasons that support the recommendation [35]. By contrast, decision
frameworks from AI have, by construction, the ability to naturally provide such an explanation. This is for instance the case
of the belief–desire–intention representation architecture [11], argumentation [25] and conditional preference networks [9].
In [18,3,2], an argumentation-based framework for making and explaining a decision is proposed. A preference relation over
the candidate options is derived from the positive and negative acceptable arguments that support each option and from an
ordering on the arguments. Another extension of argumentation to incorporate preferences can be found in [42].
In the context of multi-criteria decision making and more speciﬁcally multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) [26,34,30],
there are a few works which aim at generating an explanation of the outcome of the decision model [35,14,43]. The gener-
ation process is split into two parts: the selection of the arguments (i.e. the criteria) to be presented, and the structuration
and expression of the selected arguments in natural language. The second part is well-developed in Ref. [14]. One can note
that the expression of a selected content in natural language has been extensively studied in the literature – see for instance
[13,27] to cite a few. Concerning the selection part, the three previously mentioned works [35,14,43] use the same idea.
It consists in selecting the k (where k is a parameter) criteria that have the largest contribution to the overall utility. This
approach is not satisfactory for the following reasons. First of all, the textual explanation does not mention the weights of
the criteria [14]. This is a major drawback since the weights are essential in the MAVT model. Secondly, there is no formal
justiﬁcation of the arguments that are selected, and in particular of the choice of the k parameter.
The aim of this paper is to develop a formal framework that justiﬁes the selection of the arguments. This work is
especially dedicated to situations in which the recipient of the explanation is not the individual who has designed the
decision model. This general framework is designed for any decision model based on weights. It adapts itself automatically
to the complexity of the decision. The easier the decision, the simpler the explanation. Premises of this work can be found
in two conference papers [38,39].
Section 2 describes weighted decision models. We introduce three particular models that will be used to validate our
framework: the expected utility model [54,51], the weighted minmax model [22] and the weighted majority model [44].
The general explanation framework is presented in Section 3. In order to adapt to the complexity of the situation, several
argumentation reasonings are introduced. They are called anchors by analogy to the concept of anchor deﬁned by Grize to
refer to some implicit information used to convince an audience [32]. A subset of criteria can be selected for the explanation
if these criteria are decisive in some sense depending on the anchor. Such a subset is called an explanation set. The set of
these explanation sets forms a combinatorial structure. One then aims at ﬁnding the non-dominated explanation sets in
this structure, in the sense of an order relation expressing the simplicity of the explanation set. In the following Sections 4
through 7, this general framework is thoroughly developed on each anchor and each of the three weighted decision models.
From the properties satisﬁed by the non-dominated explanation sets, we show that the explanation to be generated can be
derived. A method or algorithm to compute a non-dominated explanation set is given in each case. We will not deal with
the expression of the selected arguments in natural language. However, examples of texts that can be generated will be
presented. Some experimental results are presented in Section 8. The proofs of the results are given in Section 10.
2. Decision models based on a weight vector
Decision theory [40,48] is interested in preference representation and gathers different domains such as Multi-Criteria
Decision Making (MCDM) [49,28,10], Decision Making under Uncertainty (DMU) [36,51] and Social Choice (SC) [6,29]. The
typical decision problem studied in decision theory consists in selecting one alternative among a set X of candidate options,
where the alternatives are described by several dimensions. This selection is obtained by the construction of a preference
relation over X . The set of ﬁnite dimensions is denoted by N = {1, . . . ,n}, and the alternatives are characterized on each
dimension i ∈ N by a value in a set Xi . In MCDM, N is the set of decision criteria, Xi is the attribute representing criterion i,
and each alternative is characterized by a value on each attribute, that is X = X1 ×· · ·× Xn . The criteria are often conﬂicting
[49]. As an example, one may have cost criteria and performance criteria, which cannot be met at the same time. The main
diﬃculty is then to ﬁnd a good compromise between the criteria. In DMU, the elements of N are the states representing the
possible situations, X1 = · · · = Xn =: C is the set of possible consequences, and an alternative (also called act) is a mapping
from N to C , that is X = CN . The consequence of selecting a particular alternative depends on which state of nature will
occur. Moreover the attitude of the decision maker (DM) towards uncertainty inﬂuences his choice strategy [51]. In SC, N is
the set of voters, X1 = · · · = Xn =: C is the set of candidates, and the alternatives are also the candidates, that is X = C . The
diﬃculty is to ﬁnd a fair consensus among the opinions of the voters [5].
The preference relation over the alternatives in X is usually constructed from a preference relation i over each set Xi .
We denote by i and ∼i the asymmetric and symmetric parts of i . In MCDM, i represents the preferences of the DM
over the elements of attribute Xi ; in DMU, 1 = · · · =n depict the preferences of the DM over the set C of consequences;
in SC, i models the preferences of voter i over the set C of candidates. There exist many preference models in which the
overall preference of an alternative y ∈ X over another alternative x ∈ X is obtained by weighing up the pros and the cons
regarding this preference. The sets A+(y, x) = {i ∈ N, yi i xi}, A−(y, x) = {i ∈ N, xi i yi} and A=(y, x) = {i ∈ N, yi ∼i xi}
are the positive, negative and null arguments respectively concerning the preference of y over x on all dimensions N . The
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a weight wi assigned to each i ∈ N together with an aggregation function depending on w = (w1, . . . ,wn) [26,49,51]. The
semantics of the weights depends on the method used. Basically, wi is interpreted as the importance of criterion i in MCDM,
as the probability or possibility of the state of nature i in DMU, and as the power of voter i in SC. The weight vector w is
normalized in some sense depending on each method used. We denote hereafter by ∧ and ∨ the min and max operators
respectively.
We are interested in several families of preference relations characterized by a weight vector w = (w1, . . . ,wn). For a
given family F of preference models, the set of weights is denoted by W(F), and the corresponding preference relation is
denoted by Fw , for w ∈ W(F). We denote by Fw and ∼Fw the asymmetric and symmetric parts of Fw . We are interested
in the models derived from an aggregated value:
∀x, y ∈ X y Fw x ⇐⇒ HFw (y, x) 0.
A classical representation is to summarize each option x ∈ X by an overall utility hFw (x). This gives HFw (y, x) = hFw (y) −
hFw (x).
The most well-known family corresponds to the expected-utility model (labelled “EU” hereafter) of von Neumann and
Morgenstern [54] and Savage [51]: hEUw (x) =
∑
i∈N wiui(xi), where wi ∈ [0,1] and ui : Xi → [0,1] is a value function mea-
suring the attractiveness of the elements of Xi . The value function ui quantiﬁes the preference relation i : for a,b ∈ Xi ,
a i b ⇐⇒ ui(a) ui(b). In MCDM, this model is the Multi-Attribute Value Theory Model [26,34]. One has W(EU) = [0,1]n .
There exist accurate elicitation methods to construct the quantitative model hEUw [7,50]. The main drawback of these
methods is their complexity, which does not ﬁt with all applications. Qualitative decision theory has been deﬁned in AI
to overcome this diﬃculty [24,19,12,20]. A pessimistic weighted extension (labelled “Pess” hereafter) of the Wald minmax
function [56] has been deﬁned in [22]: hPessw (x) =
∧
i∈N (ui(xi)∨ (1−wi)), where w is interpreted as a possibility distribution
in DMU [23]. This model has been also used in MCDM. One has W(Pess) = [0,1]n . For simplicity, we consider the interval
[0,1] also for the Pess model but any linearly ordered scale with top and bottom elements can be used as well.
The EU and Pess models both require the existence of a value representation for each i and commensurateness between
the preference scale and the weight/uncertainty scale, which is usually not easy to satisfy in practice. The majority rule
(labelled “Maj” hereafter) deﬁned in SC [44] gets rid of these two assumptions. It has also been studied in AI in a more
general framework [20]. It reads HMajw (y, x) =
∑
i∈A+(y,x) wi −
∑
i∈A−(y,x) wi . This model has some limitations due to the
Arrow’s theorem [5]. The majority rule is known in MCDM under the name concordance rule [49]. One has W(Maj) = Rn+ .
Despite some limitations, the three models EU, Pess and Maj that we have just described are used in many applications
covering very different domains. For this reason, we will focus on these models.
The set of normalized weights w.r.t. a model F is denoted by W(F). For the EU and Maj models, we have W(EU) =
W(Maj) = {w ∈ [0,1]n: ∑i∈N wi = 1}. Let us mention that, for the EU model, the normalization condition ∑i∈N wi = 1 is
equivalent to the idempotency property hEUw (α, . . . ,α) = α for all α ∈ [0,1] [31]. The weights are normalized for the model
Pess if
∨
i∈N wi = 1 and thus W(Pess) = {w ∈ [0,1]n:
∨
i∈N wi = 1} [22]. For each of the three above models, there exists
a particular normalized weight vector wF that is characterized by the property that the dimensions are symmetric in the
aggregation process. Therefore wF1 = · · · = wFn . These are the weights that one will apply in the absence of information.
They results from the application of the principles of insuﬃcient reason, maximum entropy and minimum speciﬁcity. In the
Bayesian approach, the lack of information is represented by the uniform probability wF , and in MCDM and SC, all criteria
and voters are assigned to the same weight when there is no reason to proceed differently. The vector wF will thus be
called reference weight vector. For models Maj and EU, we obtain for all i ∈ N
wMaji = wEUi =
1
n
. (1)
Maj
wMaj
corresponds to a Condorcet majority rule, and hEU
wEU
is the arithmetic mean. Let w ∈ W(EU) or w ∈ W(Maj). Since∑
i∈N wi = 1, the value wMaji = wEUi = 1n corresponds to the mean importance of a dimension in w . Hence relation wi > 1n
(resp. wi <
1
n ) means that dimension i is more important (resp. less important) than the average value
1
n and thus can be
said to be an important (resp. unimportant) dimension.
For model Pess, one has for all i ∈ N
wPessi = 1 (2)
and hPess
wPess
is the min operator.
3. General explanation framework
3.1. Why generating automatically an explanation?
From now on, we assume that F ∈ {EU,Pess,Maj} is a ﬁxed family of models, and the weight vector v ∈ W(F) has
already been speciﬁed. Let
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We consider two options x, y ∈ X and we assume that (x, y, v) ∈ D(F). We aim at explaining why y is strictly preferred to
x according to the model.
If an individual constructs his decision model Fv and is convinced about its relevance, then it is not necessary to explain
to him the comparison y Fv x. This is no more true when several actors are involved in the decision process, as shown in
the following examples.
(i) The individual that is referred to as decision maker (DM) is usually the person who is responsible for the decision. He
often has to explain his decision to other actors – for instance, his chief, his executive board or his shareholders. These
actors are not interested in the technicality of the decision model. In order to convince them on the merits of the
decision, a synthetic explanation needs to be given.
(ii) A decision support system usually generates an ordered list of recommended options from which the user of the
system decides which one to choose. Since the user is not the expert from whom the decision model has been elicited,
the recommendation shall be explained. Moreover, the user is not necessarily highly qualiﬁed, and there may be time
constraints under which the operator needs to make the decisions. Hence the explanation shall be non-technical, simple
and fast to understand for the user. An example of this is the multi-criteria decision function that recommends the
assignment of priorities to the radar tasks in radar management [8].
(iii) There are many situations in AI in which several (artiﬁcial) agents have their own preferences and thus their own
decision models. This is for instance the case in negotiation. In negotiation protocols, an offer is made by an actor
at each iteration of the protocol, and the other actors give their feedback [45,1]. They do not reveal their preference
models to the other actors since they want to keep their models private. Each actor only provides to the other ones
some clues on why the offer is, for instance, not satisfactory to him.
In the previous examples, an explanation of the recommendations produced by the decision model must be generated.
According to Klein [35], the explanation cannot be simply that, for the EU model, “y is preferred to x since the overall score∑
i∈N vi yi of y is larger than the overall score
∑
i∈N vixi of x” since it does not appeal to intuition and it does not compare the
alternatives explicitly.
Yet, in the examples (ii) and (iii) above, a synthetic explanation needs to be automatically generated and it cannot be
produced by a human. When the number of criteria is relatively large, the cognitive load to interpret the ﬁgures x, y and
v is relatively high. This load is too high for the situations in which the decision activity is very repetitive, as it is the case
in the radar management example (ii) in which the operator has to perform the same activity for several hours in a raw. In
example (iii), the values of v cannot be sent to the other agents for privacy reasons, and a synthetic explanation must be
generated by the artiﬁcial agent.
The arguments of this explanation are the elements of N . The explanation will be based on the satisfaction degrees ui(x)
and ui(y) of x and y on each dimension (for the models EU and Pess for which value functions ui exist). Hence the precise
form and expression of the value functions ui will not matter. As a result, for the sake of simplicity in the notation, we
will assume throughout the paper that the value functions ui are the identity function. Hence one can set X = [0,1]n for
the models EU and Pess. Our framework will apply on the three domains MCDM, DMU and SC. However, for the sake of
conciseness, we now restrict to MCDM for the interpretations of the results. In particular, from now on, N will correspond
to decision criteria. For x ∈ X , xi is the mark or score of x on criterion i. For the models EU and Pess, xi ∈ [0,1] is interpreted
as a satisfaction degree, where value 1 is perfectly satisfactory on the criterion and value 0 is unacceptable. Our explanation
framework can be transposed to DMU and SC.
3.2. Notation and deﬁnitions
For F ∈ {EU,Pess}, we have X = [0,1]n and we deﬁne  ∈ Rn by i = yi − xi for all i ∈ N . For F = Maj, we deﬁne
sgn ∈ {−1,0,1}N by sgni := +1 if i ∈ A+(y, x), sgni := 0 if i ∈ A=(y, x) and sgni := −1 if i ∈ A−(y, x). For S ⊆ N and
Z ∈ RN , we deﬁne π ZS : {1, . . . , s} → S , with s = |S|, by Zπ ZS (1)  · · ·  Zπ ZS (s) . Throughout this paper, we will apply this
deﬁnition to the vectors , x, y, v leading to πS , π
x
S , π
y
S ,π
v
S respectively. Let Π(S) be the set of all permutations on a
coalition S ⊆ N . For π ∈ Π(N) and w ∈ W(F), π ◦ w is the weight vector deﬁned by (π ◦ w)i = wπ(i) for all i ∈ N . For
w,w ′ ∈ W(F) and S ⊆ N , we deﬁne the compound weight vector (wS ,w ′N\S ) ∈ W(F) by (wS ,w ′N\S )i = wi if i ∈ S , and
(wS ,w ′N\S )i = w ′i otherwise.
Let
Ex= {{A1, . . . , Ap}: p ∈ N, ∅ = A1, . . . , Ap ⊆ N and Ai ∩ A j = ∅ for all i = j}.
For A,A′ ∈ Ex, we write A  A′ if for every A ∈ A, there exists A′ ∈ A′ such that A ⊆ A′ . We write A ⊆ A′ if for every
A ∈ A, we have A ∈ A′ .
For any permutation π ∈ Π(N), one can determine the ﬁnest partition (in the sense of ) A(π) := {A1, . . . , Ap} of N
such that all Ai are invariant under π (i.e. π(Ai) = Ai). For all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, one can write
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where Ai = {k1, . . . ,kqi } and qi = |Ai|. By abuse of language, Ai is thus called a cycle of π .
One can give a taxonomy of the arguments from their sign and strength. The sign of an argument follows from that of
i (see Section 2). The strength of an argument is related to the sign of vi − 1n (for the EU and Maj models): an argument
is strong, medium and weak if vi  1n , vi ≈ 1n and vi  1n respectively.
3.3. Motivation of the approach on the EUmodel
To give the general idea of our approach, let us ﬁrst focus on the EU model.
Ideally, one would like to produce an argumentation of the relation y EUv x. There are many diﬃculties to extend
argumentation to a quantitative setting. In logic-based argumentation, an argument is a pair 〈H,h〉 where h is the conclusion
and H contains the minimal elements of the knowledge base that logically entails h (i.e. H  h) [52]. Here one would like
to construct such an argument where h is the statement y EUv x and H ⊆ N is a subset of criteria. Intuitively, the criteria H
explain the decision if the decision remains unchanged whatever the values of x and y on the criteria in N \ H . It writes
H  [y EUv x] ⇐⇒ ∀x′N\H , y′N\H ∈ [0,1]N\H (yH , y′N\H)EUv (xH , x′N\H).
This is equivalent to (yH ,0N\H ) EUv (xH ,1N\H ). This condition is too strong as it is often satisﬁed only when H is almost
equal to N . The reason is that all criteria compensate each other in the EU model (see Section 2) and it is rare that a
criterion is completely useless in the decision. The diﬃculty mentioned earlier is also expressed by the fallacy of composi-
tion/division which applies on divisible objects deﬁned as the concatenation of smaller parts [33]. Quantitative models are
indeed characterized by the presence of several concatenation operators. From a measurement standpoint, the value func-
tions ui are obtained from a quantitative scale, and this latter can be constructed from a concatenation operator over Xi
and a preference relation [37]. The aggregation of the marks by hEUv also results from a concatenation materialized by an
arithmetic operator.
Let π ∈ Π(N) such that
vπ(1)|π(1)| · · · vπ(n)|π(n)|.
The explanations of the preference y EUv x proposed in [35,14,43] are similar and consist in displaying to the user the
criteria {π(q),π(q+1), . . . ,π(n)} (where q ∈ {1, . . . ,n} is a parameter). This idea of simplifying the explanation reasoning by
focusing only on a subset of the arguments is originated from the theory of argumentation. The quantity compeli := vi |i |
measuring the contribution of criterion i in the overall evaluation HEUv (y, x) is called compellingness by Klein [35]. There are
two main limitations of this approach. Firstly, there is no formal justiﬁcation why selecting these particular criteria in the
explanation. Secondly, the textual explanation that is generated does not refer to the weight vector v . Yet the behaviour of
the decision model is highly inﬂuenced by its weight vector v , and thus the explanation of the preference y Fv x should
mention the weights.
The weights play a central role in our approach. However, as shown in the following example, there are circumstances
in which it is not necessary to mention the speciﬁcity of the weights in the explanation.
Example 1. The most simple situation arises when y is strictly better than x on all criteria. There is no negative and null
argument. Clearly y Fv x for all F ∈ {EU,Pess,Maj} and all v ∈ W(F). There is no need in this trivial situation to mention
the weights v in the explanation.
In Example 1, any w ∈ W(F) yields the same comparison of y and x. This suggests to look, in the general case, at the
set VF (y, x) of weights w ∈ W(F) for which y is strictly preferred to x. In the following lemma, we restrict ourselves to
the EU model.
Lemma 1. Let VEU(y, x) := {w ∈ W(EU): y EUw x}. Let +i = i ∨ 0 and −i = (−i) ∨ 0 for all i ∈ N. If A+(y, x) = ∅ and
A−(y, x) = ∅, then:
If
∣∣A+(y, x)∣∣> 1 then ∀i ∈ A+(y, x) {wi, w ∈ VEU(y, x)}= [0,1],
If
∣∣A+(y, x)∣∣= 1 then ∀i ∈ A+(y, x) {wi, w ∈ VEU(y, x)}=
(
min
j∈A−(y,x)
−j
+i +−j
,1
]
,
∀ j ∈ A−(y, x) {w j, w ∈ VEU(y, x)}=
[
0, max
i∈A+(y,x)
+i
+i +−j
)
.
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cases.
As said in Section 3.1, the recipient of the explanation we wish to generate is supposed to have no prior on the speci-
ﬁcities of the decision model and thus on the weight vector v . Anyway, if the recipient wishes to have a prior idea of the
decision only from x and y, he will consciously or unconsciously use the less speciﬁc weights – i.e. the reference weight
wEU – on the options x and y. Hence if x has much better marks than y on average, i.e. x is much preferred to y according
to EU
wEU
, then the recipient would a priori expect that x is preferred to y. He may thus be surprised by the relation y EUv x.
Hence the explanation shall focus on explaining why the weights v and wEU yield opposite decisions.
Example 2. Assume that x = (0.7,0.7,0.5), y = (1,0,0.5) and v = (0.7,0.2,0.1), which gives y EUv x and xEUwEU y. Hence,
the weights v play here an important role in the outcome y EUv x. One feels that since x is better than y on average but y
is preferred to x with the weight vector v , then the criteria for which y is better than x are important and the criteria for
which x is better than y are not important. Recall that a criterion i is important (resp. unimportant) if vi >
1
n (resp. vi <
1
n ).
One has A+(y, x) = {1}, A−(y, x) = {2} and A=(y, x) = {3}. The weight vector v is important on the positive argument
(the ﬁrst criterion) and is not important on the negative argument (the second criterion). The conjunction of these two
phenomena actually explains the decision. Finally, the third criterion has no impact on the decision and can be removed
from the explanation.
In Lemma 1, we have studied how much one can change the weight vector v while maintaining the same preference
between x and y. We keep the same idea but instantiate it in a different manner. We look at some changes in the weights
that yield a switch of preference between x and y.
Following Example 2, a possible reasoning to select the arguments consists in understanding why the use of the reference
weight vector wF leads to the opposite comparison of x and y, compare to the weight vector v . This switch of preference
necessarily comes from the criteria for which vi is (signiﬁcantly) different from wFi . If it is possible to change vi by w
F
i
for some i ∈ N , while y remains preferred to x, then the speciﬁcity of criterion i may not be necessary in the explanation
so that i may discarded from the explanation. If the wording “x is on average at least as good as y” is contained in the
generated explanation, then there is no mistake in the reasoning consisting in not mentioning explicitly these criteria in the
explanation.
We will compare v to other weights in the following example.
Example 3. Assume that x = (0,1,0.6), y = (1,0,1) and v = (0.4,0.2,0.4), which yields y EUv x. We notice that y is on
average strictly better than x. One has A+(y, x) = {1,3} and A−(y, x) = {2}. One feels that the explanation can be the
same as in the previous example: the weight on the ﬁrst criterion which is a positive argument is important, and the
weight on the second criterion which is a negative argument is not important. Even though the last criterion is positive,
it can be discarded from the explanation. The intuition is that the ﬁrst criterion is a suﬃciently positive argument since
1 = 1 > 3 = 0.4 and v1 = 0.4 = v3. How can we justify more formally that the last criterion can be removed from
the explanation? Here is a possible justiﬁcation. The weight vector v could have been assigned to the three criteria in
a different manner. If v1 were assigned to the second criterion, v2 were assigned to the ﬁrst criterion – leading to the
weight v ′ = (0.2,0.4,0.4) – then the decision would have been the opposite since xEUv ′ y. The inversion of the preferences
between x and y comes from a switch of the weight of criteria 1 and 2, and criterion 3 has not played any role in this
inversion of preference.
The explanation will be based on the identiﬁcation of the decisive criteria. As suggested by Example 3, one simple way to
determine whether a set of criteria are decisive is to look at the inﬂuence of permuting their weights. If the positioning of
these weights is very crucial, then a permutation will invert the decision. Our last example shows that several explanations
can be generated for a given choice y EUv x.
Example 4. Assume that x= (0.5,0.5,1), y = (1,1,0) and v = (0.4,0.4,0.2), which gives y EUv x. One has A+(y, x) = {1,2}
and A−(y, x) = {3}. One can proceed as in Example 3. If one switches the weights of criteria 1 and 3 – leading to v ′ =
(0.2,0.4,0.4) – we obtain x EUv ′ y. Hence the explanation of y EUv x could be that y is better than x on criterion 1 which
is important and x is better than y on criterion 3 which is not important. Another explanation can be generated. One could
indeed switch criteria 2 and 3, and thus the explanation could focus as well on criteria 2 and 3.
3.4. Description of the general framework
Based on the previous Examples 1 through 4, the following points can be raised.
• First of all, three different types of explanation reasonings have been made in the previous examples: one for Example 1,
one for Example 2 and one for the two Examples 3 and 4. The presentation of each type of explanation to the user
requires a different reasoning. This latter is based on some implicit information and is thus related to the concept of an
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The anchor corresponds to some implicit reasoning rules that are not explicitly quoted in an argumentation [55]. The
missing causal relations in the argumentation are then drawn automatically by the audience. In our case, we will use
the term anchor to denote a generic way of reasoning in the explanation. The set of all anchors is denoted by Ψ .
An anchor cannot be used in all situations, that is for any value of x, y and v . We denote by D(F ,ψ) the set of values
of (x, y, v) ∈ D(F) for which anchor ψ can be applied.
• Secondly, in Examples 3 and 4, the explanation concerns a permutation of the weights of two criteria. In more complex
situations, several cycles may be necessary. In this case, the explanation is composed of a set of disjoint coalitions
of criteria, and is thus an element of Ex. Each coalition of criteria in this set is called an elementary argument. Let
Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψ) ⊆ Ex be the set of explanation sets allowed with anchor ψ ∈ Ψ to explain the preference y Fv x. We
have Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψ) = ∅ when (x, y, v) /∈ D(F ,ψ).
Deﬁnition 1. For (x, y, v) ∈ D(F), an explanation set of the prescription y Fv x is an element of the following set
Ex(x, y, v,F) = {(ψ,A): ψ ∈ Ψ and A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F,ψ)}.
For (ψ,A) ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F), A ∩ A+(y, x), A ∩ A=(y, x) and A ∩ A−(y, x) are the positive, null and negative arguments
respectively used in the explanation, where A :=⋃S∈A S . In Examples 2, 3 and 4, we have seen that some arguments
may be absent from the explanation. This means that A is not necessarily equal to N .
We describe in this paragraph the formalism we will use to justify the selection of some arguments in the explanation
and the removal of the other ones.
The set Ex(x, y, v,F) is a combinatorial structure composed of many elements. In order to select the simplest explanation
set, we deﬁne an order relation  over Ex. Relation ex  ex′ means that the explanation set ex is not more complex to
understand than ex′ . The anchors are more or less simple to understand. There is thus an order relation  over Ψ . We
denote by  the asymmetric part of  and by ≡ the symmetric part of . One prefers unconditionally an explanation set
using a simple anchor than any explanation set using a more complex anchor. The order relation  over Ex(x, y, v,F) is
thus deﬁned as follows: (ψ,A) (ψ ′,A′) if one of the following two conditions is met
• ψ ψ ′ ,
• ψ ≡ ψ ′ , A  A′ (i.e. A is simpler than A′).
We are interested in the simplest explanation sets of y Fv x, that is the minimal elements of Ex(x, y, v,F) in the sense
of .
The set Ex forms a combinatorial structure. The number of partitions of k blocks in a set of p elements is the Stirling
number Skp of the second kind deﬁned by [4]
Skp :=
1
k!
k∑
i=0
(−1)k−i
(
k
i
)
ip .
Hence the cardinality of Ex is
n∑
p=1
p∑
k=1
Skp .
The exploration of Ex to ﬁnd the simplest explanation set is expected to be complex.
3.5. Descriptions of the anchors
There remains to describe the anchors. Generalizing Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4, the set Ψ is composed of four anchors
Ψ = {ψALL,ψNOA,ψIVT,ψRMG}.
• Anchor “all” ψALL (generalization of Example 1). When y is preferred to x on all criteria (i.e. A−(y, x) = A=(y, x) = ∅),
y is preferred to x according to any preference model (see Example 1).
D(F,ψALL) =
{
(x, y, v) ∈ D(F): A+(y, x) = N}.
No speciﬁcity of Fv needs to be quoted in the explanation. There is thus only one elementary argument which is the
grand coalition {N}: Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψALL) = {{N}}.
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weight wF leads to the opposite decision (see Example 2), that is y Fv x whereas xFwF y. The reference weights wF
act as an anchor since the recipient of the explanation may think of wF . Hence
D(F,ψNOA) =
{
(x, y, v) ∈ D(F): xF
wF y
}
.
Following Example 2, the criteria i for which vi can be replaced by wFi , while y remains preferred to x, are discarded
from the explanation. Therefore, for an explanation set A, y is strictly preferred to x with the weights (vA,wFN\A).
Note that weights (vA,w
F
N\A) may not be normalized, but this does not matter. The criteria in N \ A are not decisive
in the sense that their weights are either not inﬂuencing the decision or close to the reference weight. If the criteria A
are described in the explanation, then N \ A may not be mentioned in the explanation.
The set of elementary arguments is the coalition structure 〈N〉 composed of the singletons of N . Hence if xF
wF y, we
deﬁne
Ex(x, y, v,F,ψNOA) :=
{A ⊆ 〈N〉: y F
(vA,w
F
N\A)
x
}
and otherwise we set Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA) := ∅.
• Anchor “invert” ψIVT (generalization of Examples 3 and 4). The idea of this anchor is to say that the decision would
not have been the same if some weights of v were switched. Hence we set
D(F,ψIVT) =
{
(x, y, v) ∈ D(F): ∃π ∈ Π(N) xFπ◦v y
}
.
The elementary arguments are the cycles of π . In the explanation that is generated, an implicit justiﬁcation of why
some arguments are discarded shall be given. In Examples 3 and 4, the criteria that are not used in the explanation
keep their original weight v . We denote by A the explanation set. The preference between x and y is switched when
the weights assigned to the criteria A are π ◦ v and the remaining criteria N \ A keep their original weight v . The set
A must be a union of cycles of π , and thus A ⊆ A(π). Therefore, we deﬁne
Ex(x, y, v,F,ψIVT) :=
{A: ∃π ∈ Π(N) with xF(π◦vA,vN\A) y and A ⊆ A(π)}.
The analysis of the situations in which a different assignment of the weights to the criteria yields an inversion of
preference between x and y helps to understand what are the decisive criteria.
• Anchor “remaining” ψRMG. This case occurs when none of the previous anchors applies. Hence
D(F,ψRMG) =
{
(x, y, v) ∈ D(F): A+(y, x) = N, y F
wF x and ∀π ∈ Π(N), y Fπ◦v x
}
.
As we will see in Section 7, there is only one elementary argument which is the grand coalition {N}: Ex(x, y, v,F ,
ψRMG) = {{N}}.
All the previous anchors are ordered according to their intrinsic complexity:
ψALL ψNOA ψIVT ψRMG.
The four anchors are derived from the previous examples. In the rest of the paper, we prove that the intuition given in
the examples of Section 3.3 on the EU model holds in all situations of x, y and v , and that this intuition also generalizes
to the other models Pess and Maj. More precisely, we ﬁrst derive the important properties of the minimal elements of
Ex(x, y, v,F). From these properties we show that convincing explanations can be generated in all cases. Sections 4, 5, 6
and 7 study the anchors ψALL, ψNOA, ψIVT and ψRMG respectively. In each section, the three decision models EU, Maj and
Pess are analysed.
4. Anchor “all”
When A+(y, x) = N , the fact that y Fv x is trivial since y is preferred to x according to any decision model.
The following sentence can be generated to explain y Fv x for this anchor.
y is preferred to x since y is better than x on ALL criteria.
5. Anchor “not on average”
We assume throughout this section that the anchor “not on average” holds and thus y F
wF x. The explanation synthesis
is obtained from the understanding of why the weight vectors v and wF yield different decisions regarding x and y, where
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set of criteria that need to keep their original weight, while the other criteria can take the weight value of wF , so that y
remains preferred to x.
For the sake of simplicity in the notation, 〈N〉 is assimilated to N in this section. Hence the elements of Ex(x, y, v,F ,
ψNOA) are assimilated to coalitions of N . The minimal explanation sets with anchor ψNOA according to  are exactly the
minimal coalitions of Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA) according to ⊆.
Lemma 2. A coalition S ⊆ N is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA) if and only if
S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F,ψNOA) and ∀k ∈ S, S \ {k} /∈ Ex(x, y, v,F,ψNOA). (3)
Note that N ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA) and ∅ /∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA).
5.1. Expected utility model
Proposition 1. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) be minimal in the sense of ⊆. Then necessarily one has vk = 1n for all k ∈ S and S ⊆
A+(y, x)∪ A−(y, x). Moreover, for all k ∈ S,
k ∈ A+(y, x) ⇔ vk > 1n ,
k ∈ A−(y, x) ⇔ vk < 1n .
Interpretation 1. From Proposition 1, the selected criteria S are clearly decisive since S contains no null argument, the
positive arguments S ∩ A+(y, x) are strong (i.e. their importance is larger than the mean weight 1n ) and the negative
arguments S∩ A−(y, x) are weak (i.e. their importance is lower than 1n ). We have thus shown that the intuition of Example 2
is true in the general case. Hence the arguments that are selected can be presented in a very natural way to the recipient.
If the set S ⊆ N is selected, the reason why the other criteria are not mentioned is that the outcome would have been the
same if these criteria had a medium importance. Hence a general sentence about the situation of the criteria in N \ S is
enough and one needs only to show the speciﬁcity of the criteria in S .
We are now interested in the generation of an explanation to the user. The explanation that is automatically generated
can take the following structure: a concession to the reverse preference (namely y EU
wEU
x) that is disproved, followed by
a statement of the preference (namely y EUv x) and the list S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) (with S minimal) of arguments. This
structure is classical in argumentation [17]. Relation y EU
wEU
x means that x is better than y on average. The following
sentence can thus be generated to explain y EUv x:
Even though x is better than y on average, y is preferred to x since y is better
than x on the criteria S ∩ A+(y, x) that are important whereas y is worse than x on
the criteria S ∩ A−(y, x) that are not important.
The following additional sentence can be added if
∑
i∈N\S vii > 0
Moreover, y is on average better than x on the other criteria.
This explanation aims at convincing an audience that would a priori think that x is preferred to y (because x is better
on average), that the opposite preference holds. This is illustrated in Section 8.2.1 on several examples. Section 8.2.1 also
presents a comparison of our approach with the Klein method.
Let us now give a simple method to compute a minimal element of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA). Let π ∈ Π(N) such that
(
vπ(1) − 1
n
)
π(1)  · · ·
(
vπ(n) − 1
n
)
π(n).
Proposition 2. Let p be the largest integer in {1, . . . ,n} such that {π(p), . . . ,π(n)} ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA). Then {π(p), . . . ,π(n)}
is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA). Moreover, there is no minimal coalition of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) with a strictly smaller cardinality
than {π(p), . . . ,π(n)}.
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Proposition 3. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA) beminimal. Then necessarily one has vk = 1n for all k ∈ S, and S ⊆ A+(y, x)∪ A−(y, x).
Moreover, for all k ∈ S,
k ∈ A+(y, x) ⇔ vk > 1n ,
k ∈ A−(y, x) ⇔ vk < 1n .
From Proposition 3, for any minimal explanation set, the positive arguments are strong and the negative arguments are
weak. This is similar to Interpretation 1.
The explanation of the preference of y over x follows the same structure as in Section 5.1. Relation y Maj
wMaj
x means that
there are more criteria for which x is preferred to y than criteria for which y is preferred to x. The following sentence can
be generated to explain y Majv x:
Even though there are more criteria for which x is preferred to y than criteria
for which y is preferred to x, y is nevertheless preferred to x since the criteria
S ∩ A+(y, x) for which y is better than x are important whereas the criteria S ∩ A−(y, x)
for which x is better than y are not important.
Let us now give a simple method to compute a minimal element of Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA). Let π ∈ Π(N) such that(
vπ(1) − 1
n
)
sgnπ(1)  · · ·
(
vπ(n) − 1
n
)
sgnπ(n) .
Proposition 4. Let p be the largest element of {1, . . . ,n} such that {π(p), . . . ,π(n)} ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA). Then {π(p), . . . ,π(n)}
is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA). Moreover, there is no minimal coalition of Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA) with a strictly smaller cardi-
nality than {π(p), . . . ,π(n)}.
5.3. Pessimistic qualitative model
Let hPess,Sw (z) =
∧
i∈S(zi ∨ (1−wi)), with S ⊆ N . In the weighted minimum aggregation function hPessv (x), the contribution
of a criterion i ∈ N is xi ∨ (1 − vi). The value of 1 − vi is small when criterion i is important. Hence a bad score on an
important criterion cannot be saved by the other criteria, and the overall score is necessarily bad. On the contrary, a bad
score on an unimportant criterion is saved by its small weight.
Proposition 5. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA) be minimal. Then S ⊆ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x) and for all k ∈ S, yk < 1− vk. Moreover,
hPess,Sv (x) hPess,Sv (y) >
∧
i∈N\S
xi and
∧
i∈N\S
yi >
∧
i∈N\S
xi .
Finally, we have hPess,Sv (x) hPess,Sv (y) > hPess,N\Sv (x) and hPess,N\Sv (y) > hPess,N\Sv (x).
Relation yk < 1 − vk for k ∈ S means that the weight of criterion k hides the bad score yk . Hence S consists only in
weak negative or null arguments. This proposition also shows that the worse mark of x on the remaining criteria (i.e. N \ S)
is lower than any score of y in N \ S and is also lower than the aggregated score of y in S . Moreover, hPessv (x) is attained in
N \ S .
A positive argument cannot be selected in Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA) since this set only consists of negative or null argu-
ments. The following proposition shows that some criteria not in S (for S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA)) might be advantageously
be added in the explanation.
Proposition 6. Assume that hPessv (x) is attained at k
x ∈ N: hPessv (x) = xkx ∨ (1− vkx ). Then kx ∈ A+(y, x) and ykx > 1− vkx .
Let M := {k ∈ N, yk  hPessv (x)}. For every S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA)minimal, we have S ⊆ M.Moreover, 1− vk > xkx ∨(1− vkx )
for every k ∈ M.
Interpretation 2. Thanks to Propositions 5 and 6, this anchor is relatively simple. The set of arguments can indeed be
divided into parts. On the one hand, the selected arguments S are negative and weak arguments. On these criteria, y has a
worse score than x but this is saved by the relatively small value of the weight (since yk < 1− vk). The value of the weight
is thus crucial for these criteria. On the other hand, the non-selected arguments N \ S are criteria for which the value of
1420 C. Labreuche / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1410–1448the weight is either not decisive or close to the reference weight 1. The only really decisive criteria in N \ S is kx for which
the overall score hPessv (x) of x is attained. This criterion is suﬃciently important so that it does not hide the score of x (see
conditions on 1− vk in Proposition 6). The remaining criteria N \ (S ∪ {kx}) may not be mentioned. If one wishes to provide
a comprehensive explanation, one may add that the bad evaluation of y on the criteria in M∗ := {k ∈ N \ S, yk  hPessv (x)} =
M \ S is saved by their relatively small importance. Indeed, from Proposition 6, we have 1 − vk > xkx ∨ (1 − vkx ) for all
k ∈ M∗ , and thus, the criteria in M∗ are relatively unimportant. Note that M∗ may contain negative or null arguments even
though this set will be most of the time composed of only positive arguments. Finally, y is relatively good on the remaining
criteria N \ (S ∪ M∗ ∪ {kx}).
The following sentences can be generated to explain y Pessv x:
Even though the worst score of y is worse than that of x, y is nevertheless preferred
to x since the relatively bad scores of y compared to that of x on criteria S are
saved by their relatively small importance.
The overall score of x is attained at criterion kx for which x is worse than y and
the relatively large importance does not save x.
On the criteria M∗, the bad evaluation of y is saved by the relatively small
importance of these criteria. Finally, y is sufficiently good on the remaining
criteria N \ (S ∪ M∗ ∪ {kx}).
The last sentence means that the score of y on the criteria N \ (S ∪M∗ ∪ {kx}) needs just to be larger than the overall score
of x. An illustration is proposed in Example 7 in Section 8.2.2.
The following proposition provides a simple way to compute a minimal explanation set.
Proposition 7. Let p be the smallest integer of {1, . . . ,n} such that {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (p)} ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA), where π yN ∈ Π(N)
is deﬁned in the beginning of Section 3. Then {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (p)} is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA).
It might seem surprising that x is not taken into account in the permutation used to compute a minimal explanation set.
In fact, since
∧
i /∈S xi <
∧
i /∈S yi , it is clear that π
y
N (1) ∈ A=(y, x)∪ A−(y, x).
6. Anchor “invert”
We assume in this section that there exists π ∈ Π(N) such that y Fπ◦v x. We aim at determining the arguments ex-
plaining why y Fv x even though y Fπ◦v x. The minimal arguments with anchor ψIVT are exactly the minimal elements of
Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψIVT) in the sense of .
Proposition 8. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of . Then for every S ∈ A, |S| 2.
6.1. Expected utility model
We need the following result.
Lemma 3. Let S ⊆ N and s = |S|. Then maxπ∈Π(S)∑i∈S vπ(i)i is attained at π S ∈ Π(S) deﬁned by π S( j) = π vS ((πS )−1( j)) for
all j ∈ S. Moreover, minπ∈Π(S)∑i∈S vπ(i)i is attained at π S ∈ Π(S) deﬁned by π S( j) = π vS (s− (πS )−1( j)+ 1) for all j ∈ S.
The minimal explanation sets are characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 9. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of. Let π ∈ Π(N) such that xEU(π◦vA,vN\A) y and A ⊆ A(π).
We can choose π such that π(i) = i for all i ∈ N \ A.
Let S ∈ A. Then for all k, j ∈ S with j = k we have k =  j , vπ( j) = vπ(k) and
(vπ( j) − vπ(k))× (k − j) > 0. (4)
Moreover, πS (1)
< πS (2)
< · · · < πS (|S|) , and
vπ◦πS (1) > vπ◦πS (2) > · · · > vπ◦πS (|S|). (5)
Hence for all j ∈ S, π( j) = π S ( j). Finally,∑
j∈S
v j j >
∑
j∈S
vπ S ( j) j.
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< πS (2)
< · · · < πS (|S|) , there is at most one null argument in every S ∈ A. Moreover, since
π = π S over each S ∈ A, the allocation of the weights to the criteria according to π is the most favourable one relatively
to an inversion of the comparison between x and y.
We are now interested in the generation of the explanation to the user. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψIVT) be minimal in the
sense of . Relation (5) means that, among each cycle S of π , the ordering π assigns the largest weights to the most
negative criteria (i.e. to the criteria that have the smallest value of ) and the smallest weights to the most positive criteria.
Proposition 9 shows that if the weights are assigned differently in a cycle S , then the preference between x and y is not
reversed. According to Proposition 9, we have
∀i, j ∈ S if i <  j, then vπ(i) > vπ( j).
We have y EUv x since there exist i, j ∈ S with i <  j such that the weight vi assigned to criterion i is not larger than
the weight v j assigned to criterion j. The explanation can thus focus on the following pairs:
RS :=
{
(i, j) ∈ S2: i <  j and vi < v j
}
.
For R ⊂ S2, if R is seen as a binary relation, we deﬁne the transitive closure R of R as the smallest subset of S2 such that
R ⊆ R , and[
(i, j) ∈ R and ( j,k) ∈ R] ⇒ (i,k) ∈ R.
The set RS is stable under the transitive closure. Let us denote by R∗S ⊆ RS the smallest subset R of S2 such that R = RS .
For the explanation, we can restrict ourselves to the pairs in R∗S since the other pairs RS \ R∗S can be deduced from R∗S by
transitivity. Let R∗ =⋃S∈A R∗S .
The explanation does not consist of a concatenation of an elementary text for each pair in R∗ . We organize the arguments
in R∗ into four sets of arguments CPS (positive and strong), CPRS (positive and relatively strong), CNW (negative and weak),
CNRW (negative and relatively weak), and a set of pairs of arguments CPN (a positive and a negative argument). Let (i, j) ∈ R∗ .
We have three cases.
(i) j ∈ A+(y, x), i ∈ A−(y, x) and vi < v j . This situation is illustrated by Example 10 in Section 8.3.1. The strength of the
positive argument j is larger than that of the negative argument i. If v j  1n and vi 
1
n , then j is added in CPS and i
is added in CNW. If the previous condition does not hold but vi  v j then the pair (i, j) is added in CPN. Finally, if the
previous conditions do not hold, then j is added in CPS when v j  1n and i is added in CNW when vi 
1
n . Note that
one of the previous two cases necessarily holds.
(ii) i, j ∈ A+(y, x),  j > i and vi < v j . This situation is illustrated by Example 10 in Section 8.3.1. The fact that the pair
(i, j) is selected emphasises the fact that criterion j is stronger and more positive than i. If criterion j had the smaller
weight vi of criterion i and if criterion i had the larger weight v j , then the decision would have been the opposite.
Criterion i is present in the selected pair (i, j) only as a comparison to the situation of criterion j. Hence, criterion i is
not mentioned in the explanation. Therefore, if v j  1n , then j is added in CPS, otherwise j is added in CPRS.
(iii) i, j ∈ A−(y, x),  j > i and vi < v j . The situation is dual to (ii). Likewise, the most striking criterion is i since it is
more negative and weaker than j. Criterion j is present only to emphasis this difference and is thus not mentioned.
Therefore, if v j  1n , then i is added in CNW, otherwise i is added in CNRW.
Interpretation 3. In anchor ψIVT, there are more positive reasons regarding option y compared to the situation of the anchor
ψNOA since y is here better on average than x. We are looking for the permutations in the assignment of the weights to
the criteria, that invert the decision. These permutations are used to identify the decisive criteria. More precisely, from
Proposition 9, the permutation π that is selected assigns in each cycle of π , the largest weights to the most negative
criteria and the smallest weights to the most positive criteria. Hence a criterion for which this property is satisﬁed without
the permutation, cannot be selected. The criteria that are likely to be selected are thus the positive arguments that are
strong and the negative ones that are weak. Yet the selection process in ψIVT can be seen as a relaxation of that in ψNOA as
one may now consider a positive criterion which weight is lower than 1n , and a negative criterion which weight is greater
than 1n .
The arguments that are displayed among the elements of R∗ are contained in C = 〈CPS,CPRS,CNW,CNRW,CPN〉. Several
examples of the computation of C are given in Section 8.3.1. The explanation can be the following one:
y is preferred to x since y is better than x on the criteria CPS that are important
and on the criteria CPRS that are relatively important, x is better than y on the
criteria CNW that are not important and on the criteria CNRW that are not really
important, and [criterion j for which y is better than x is more important than
criterion i for which y is worse than x]for all (i, j)∈CPN.
The argument in the brackets is repeated for all (i, j) ∈ CPN.
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anchor ψNOA, there is no property of the non-selected criteria. It is then possible to consider all minimal explanation sets A
with the smallest number of elements and to concatenate the explanation for these sets. This is illustrated in Example 15
in Section 8.4.
We now wish to compute a minimal element A of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT). First of all, one can search for A without search-
ing for a permutation π . Proposition 9 shows indeed that, for A minimal, the restriction of π on S is equal to π S for all
S ∈ A, and π(i) = i for all i ∈ N \ A. Let us deﬁne for S ⊆ N
DEUS :=
∑
j∈S
v j j − min
π∈Π(S)
∑
j∈S
vπ( j) j.
By Lemma 3, DEUS =
∑
j∈S (v j − vπ S ( j)) j . By Proposition 9, DEUS > 0 for S ∈ A. The subsets S for which DEUS = 0 are not
candidate coalitions for A. We set
S = {S ⊆ N: DEUS > 0 and A(π S) = {S}}.
If A(π S)  {S}, then the coalition structure A(π S) =: {S1, . . . , Sr} can be decomposed in sub-coalitions S1, . . . , Sr of S .
Since DEUS = DEUS1 +· · ·+ DEUSr , coalition S can be replaced by the simpler coalitions {S1, . . . , Sr}, and thus S is discarded. This
explains the condition A(π S ) = {S} in the deﬁnition of S .
The elements of S are labelled in the following order
S = {T1, T2, . . . , T p}
with p = |S|, T1 lexi T2 lexi · · ·lexi T p , and lexi is deﬁned by
S lexi T ⇐⇒ either |S| < |T | or [|S| = |T | and DEUS  DEUT ].
This is a lexicographic ordering where one looks ﬁrst at the cardinality and then at the value of DEU. It can be interpreted
in terms of the simplicity of presenting a coalition in the explanation. This order relation can be extended to explanation
sets. We deﬁne discri over Ex as follows: For {A1, . . . , Aq}, {B1, . . . , Br} ∈ Ex with A1lexi · · ·lexi Aq and B1lexi · · ·lexi Br ,
we have {A1, . . . , Aq}∗discri {B1, . . . , Br} if[∃k ∈ {1, . . . , t} |Aq| = |Br |, . . . , |Aq−k+1| = |Br−k+1| and |Aq−k| < |Br−k|]
or
[|Aq| = |Br |, . . . ,q < r and |A1| = |Br−q+1|]
where t = q ∧ r, and we have {A1, . . . , Aq}discri {B1, . . . , Br} if {A1, . . . , Aq}∗discri {B1, . . . , Br} or
q = r and |A1| = |B1|, . . . , |Aq| = |Bq|
and ∃k ∈ {1, . . . , t} DA1 = DB1 , . . . , DAk−1 = DBk−1 and DAk > DBk .
In the explanation set {A1, . . . , Aq}, all coalitions will be explained to the user and Aq is the most complex coalition of
this set. Hence when comparing two explanation sets, we compare the most complex coalition of the ﬁrst explanation set
with that of the second one, then, in case of equality, do the same with the second most complex coalition, and so on.
This is described by ∗discri. When the two explanations sets have coalitions of the same cardinality, one then looks at
the value of D . This is depicted in discri. We deﬁne ≡discri over Ex as follows: with the same notation as before, we set
{A1, . . . , Aq} ≡discri {B1, . . . , Br} if
q = r and |A1| = |B1|, . . . , |Aq| = |Bq| and DA1 = DB1 , . . . , DAq = DBq .
Finally, we deﬁne discri by A discri B if either Adiscri B or A ≡discri B. The order discri is a complete order that reﬁnes
 in the sense that [21]:
(i) A B ⇒ Adiscri B,
(ii) ∃A,B ∈ Ex, A  B, B A and Adiscri B.
We deﬁne Algorithm Algo-EU (see Table 1) to determine a minimal explanation set A. In this algorithm, B contains the
best explanation set (in the sense of the complete order discri) found so far.
Proposition 10. Algorithm Algo-EU always returns a non-empty explanation set. Moreover, the outcome of Algorithm Algo-EU is an
element of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) that is minimal in the sense of . Finally, the outcome of Algorithm Algo-EU is a minimal argumenta-
tion set in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) in the sense of discri .
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Algorithm for the determination of A.
Algorithm Algo-EU:
• The algorithm returns the output of Algo(∅,∅,0).
• Algo(A,B,k):
L1: For i = k+ 1, . . . , p:
L2: If Ti ∩ A = ∅:
L3: If
∑
S∈A DEUS + DEUTi  HEUv (y, x)
L4: then C ← A ∪ {{Ti}},
L5: else // Branching:
L6: C ← Algo(A ∪ {{Ti}},B, i).
L7: // Updating the best explanation set:
L8: If C = ∅ and [B = ∅ or Cdiscri B] then B ← C.
L9: // Bounding:
L10: If B = ∅ and A ∪ {{Ti}} discri B then return B.
L11: return ∅.
To end this section, we show that Algorithm Algo-EU can be easily modiﬁed to generate all minimal explanation sets
in the sense of the partial order ∗discri. As said earlier, when one wish to enrich the generated text by considering several
explanation sets, all these sets shall be minimal elements of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) in the sense of ∗discri. To this end, discri
is replaced by ∗discri in the algorithm. Moreover, the output B of the algorithm is no more a unique explanation set but
a collection of explanation sets. Accordingly, B is now a collection of explanation sets. Then the line L8 is replaced by the
following two lines:
If C = ∅ and B = ∅ then B ← {C}.
If C = ∅ and B = ∅ and D ∈ B: D ∗discri C then B ← (B \ {D ∈ B: C ∗discri D})∪ {C}.
Moreover, line L10 is replaced by:
If B = ∅ and [∀D ∈ B: D ∗discri A ∪ {{Ti}}] then return B.
Extending Proposition 10, we obtain that the modiﬁed Algorithm Algo-EU returns the minimal elements of Ex(x, y, v,EU,
ψIVT) in the sense of ∗discri.
6.2. Weighted majority model
Proposition 11. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of . Let π ∈ Π(N) such that x EU(π◦vA,vN\A) y and A ⊆
A(π). Let S ∈ A. Then 2 |S| 3. For all k, j ∈ S, with k = j, k and j cannot belong to the same set A+(y, x), A=(y, x) or A−(y, x).
Moreover, we have
• If [ j ∈ A+(y, x) and k ∈ A−(y, x)] or [ j ∈ A+(y, x) and k ∈ A=(y, x)] or [ j ∈ A=(y, x) and k ∈ A−(y, x)], then vπ(k) > vπ( j) .
• If [k ∈ A+(y, x) and j ∈ A−(y, x)] or [k ∈ A+(y, x) and j ∈ A=(y, x)] or [k ∈ A=(y, x) and j ∈ A−(y, x)], then vπ(k) < vπ( j) .
From Proposition 11, following the permutation π , the largest weights among the coalition S are assigned to the negative
arguments, and the smallest weights are assigned to the positive arguments. When |S| = 3, with S = {i+, i=, i−}, i+ ∈
A+(y, x), i= ∈ A=(y, x) and i− ∈ A−(y, x). The idea is that, among criteria S , the largest weight is not assigned to the
negative argument i− and the smallest weight is not assigned to the positive argument i+ . The explanation can be the
same as in the previous section. First, the set R∗ is computed. Then the ﬁve sets of arguments CPS, CPRS, CNW, CNRW and
CPN are constructed. The generated text is similar to that in the previous section.
Algorithm Algo-EU described in Section 6.1 can be adapted with minor changes to determine a minimal explanation set
with the Maj model. One only needs to change DEUS by
DMajS :=
∑
j∈S
v j sgn j − min
π∈Π(S)
∑
j∈S
vπ( j) sgn j =
∑
j∈S
(v j − vπ S ( j)) sgn j
and condition
∑
S∈B DEUS + DEUSi  HEUv (y, x) by
∑
S∈B D
Maj
S + DMajSi  H
Maj
v (y, x).
6.3. Pessimistic qualitative model
Proposition 12. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of . Let π ∈ Π(N) such that x Pess(π◦vA,vN\A) y and A ⊆
A(π).
For every S ∈ A, there exist K S ⊆ (A+(y, x)∪ A=(y, x))∩ S and J S ⊆ A−(y, x)∩ S such that
1424 C. Labreuche / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1410–1448{
vπ(i): i ∈
(
A−(y, x)∩ S) \ J S}> {vπ(k): k ∈ KS} {vπ( j): j ∈ J S}
>
{
vπ(i): i ∈
((
A+(y, x)∪ A=(y, x))∩ S) \ KS}.
The sets KS and J S , for S ∈ A, satisfy the following properties:
• There exists at most a subset S ∈ A such that KS = ∅. For this coalition S, one has |KS | = 1.
• For all S ∈ A, J S = ∅ whenever KS = ∅.
• If S = N, then KS ∪ J S = N.
Let S ∈ A. If K S = ∅ and KS = {k}, then
hPess,N\{k}π◦v (x) = hPess,N\( J S∪{k})π◦v (x).
The last relation in Proposition 12 means that criteria J S do not count in the overall evaluations of x and y.
Interpretation 4. Without the permutation π , we are not in the situation described in Proposition 12. Hence the largest
weights among a coalition S ∈ A are not assigned to the negative arguments (except for J S ), and the smallest weights are
not assigned to the positive arguments (except for KS ). The idea is that, among the selected criteria, the positive arguments
have a larger weight than the negative ones, which is quite easy to understand.
As in Section 8.3.1, one may compute R∗ and C = 〈CPS,CPRS,CNW,CNRW,CPN〉. More precisely, for all S ∈ A, we deﬁne
the pair (AS , BS ) (with AS = (S ∩ A−(y, x)) \ J S and BS = [S ∩ (A+(y, x) ∪ A−(y, x))] \ KS ) such that ∀i ∈ AS , ∀ j ∈ BS , i is
negative, j is positive or null, and vi < v j . The explanation can thus be the following one:
y is preferred to x since [criteria AS for which y is better than x are more important
than criteria BS for which y is worse than x]for all S∈A.
When KS ∪ J S = S , another explanation must be given. From the inequalities contained in (17) (see the proof of Propo-
sition 12), the marks of x and y on the positive argument k are bad but are saved by the small weight of criterion k, since
1− vπ( j) is relatively large for all j ∈ S \ {k}. Moreover, the marks of x and y on the negative arguments J S are good. From
the last relation in Proposition 12, the relatively bad overall utility of x is not attained in S but in the other criteria. The
explanation can thus be the following one:
. . . [the bad scores of x and y on the positive argument k are saved by its small
weight, the marks of x and y on the other criteria of S are good, and the relatively
bad overall utility of x compared to y is due to the criteria not in S]S.
Let us turn now to the computation of a minimal element of Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψIVT). It is not necessary to explore this
combinatorial structure. We use the characterization of the situation of the anchor ψRMG described in Proposition 19 given
in Section 7.3. According to this proposition, if there exists a permutation that inverts the preference between x and y, then
one of the three conditions (i), (ii) or (iii) in Proposition 19 is violated.
Proposition 20 gives an equivalent condition for the satisfaction of (i). This condition can be easily checked. In the proof
of this proposition, a permutation π1 is constructed when (i) is violated. In this case, we have y Pessπ1 x by construction.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 19 can be easily checked in practice. When it is violated, a permutation π2 is constructed
in the proof of this proposition. It satisﬁes y Pess
π2
x by construction.
Condition (iii) in Proposition 19 is equivalent to relation (12) according to Proposition 21. Condition (12) can be easily
checked in practice. This condition is the conjunction of two conditions. When the ﬁrst part of (12) is violated, one has
y Pess
π3
x, where π3 is deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 21. When the second part of (12) is violated, one has y Pessπ4 x,
where π4 is deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 21.
A permutation that ensures the switch of preferences is thus easily constructed in all cases. One can reﬁne these permu-
tations to obtain cycles with the smallest cardinality. This provides a minimal element of Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψIVT).
7. Anchor “remaining case”
We assume in this section that the anchor ψRMG applies, and thus
A+(y, x) = N, y F
wF x and ∀π ∈ Π(N), y Fπ◦v x. (6)
The following result shows that the last relation in (6) implies that the middle relation in (6) also holds.
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∀π ∈ Π(N), y Fπ◦v x "⇒ y FwF x.
It proves that when anchor “invert” does not apply, the decision would be the same with the reference weights. Further-
more, the preference of y over x is probably strong with the reference weights.
7.1. Expected utility model
By Lemma 3, if there does not exist π ∈ Π(N) such that HEUπ◦v(y, x) 0, then
0< min
π∈Π(N) H
EU
π◦v(y, x) = HEUπN◦v(y, x).
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the anchor ψRMG to be applied is that
A+(y, x) = N and HEUπN◦v(y, x) > 0.
Lemma 5. One has for any v ∈ W(EU) and any z ∈ [0,1]n
hEUwEU(z) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
hEUπ◦v(z).
There is a geometrical interpretation of this result. The set of weights π ◦ v where π can be any permutation forms the
vertices of a polyhedron (interpreted as a set of normalized weights). The arithmetic mean is the centre of gravity of these
vertices.
Proposition 13.We have
HEUπN◦v(y, x) H
EU
wEU(y, x).
Moreover, assume that
∃i, j ∈ N, i =  j . (7)
Then HEUπN◦v(y, x) = HEUwEU (y, x) if and only if for all i ∈ N, vi = 1n .
Lemma 4 when F = EU follows from the ﬁrst part of Proposition 13.
When anchor ψRMG applies, there are both positive and negative arguments. Hence (7) holds. Proposition 13 suggests
that there are basically two cases to explain why y remains preferred to x even when the weights are switched. The ﬁrst
case occurs when the weights are more or less the same (hence v ≈ wEU). A permutation of the weights has indeed no
impact on the comparison of x and y. In the other case, the weights are signiﬁcantly different. Hence, since y remains
preferred to x for every permutation of the weights, y is expected to be much better than x on average. We need the
following two propositions to understand the separation between the previous two cases. More precisely, they establish a
relationship between the closeness of v to the reference weight wEU, and the closeness of HEU
wEU
(y, x) to HEUπN◦v(y, x).
Proposition 14. If (7) is satisﬁed and v ∈ W(EU) is different from wEU , then
HEU
wEU
(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)
maxπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)
 1
n
.
Moreover this inequality is sharp in the sense that one can ﬁnd x, y, v such that the previous relation is satisﬁed with an equality.
Proposition 15.We set
ν :=max
i∈N
∣∣∣∣vi − 1n
∣∣∣∣, δ :=maxi, j |i − j| and χEU :=
∣∣HEUwEU(y, x)− HEUπN◦v(y, x)∣∣.
Then
ν  (n− 1)
n
HEUπN◦v(y, x)− HEUπN◦v(y, x)
δ
and ν  (n− 1)χ
EU
δ
.
Moreover, these inequalities are sharp.
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• ν ≈ 0 (say ν  εν in practice, where εν is a parameter).
Interpretation 5. The weights v of the criteria are neutral in the sense that there is no speciﬁcity that could favour
a criterion or disfavour another criterion. Hence HEUv is almost equal to the arithmetic mean H
EU
wEU
. This means that
y EUv x follows from the relation y EUwEU x. This latter relation is easy to understand and to be checked by the user.
The explanation can thus be the following one:
y is preferred to x since y is on average better than x and all the criteria have
almost the same weights.
• ν ≈ 0 (say ν > εν in practice).
Interpretation 6. When the weights of the criteria are very different, the large weights can be assigned indifferently on
the positive and negative arguments, without inverting the preference of y over x. One feels intuitively that this comes
from the fact that the value of  on A+(y, x) is on average much larger than the value of  on A−(y, x).
From Proposition 15, when ν > εν , quantity
χEU
δ
is not small. In this ratio, the denominator δ acts as a normalization.
We do not focus on the absolute values of the difference between HEU
wEU
(y, x) and HEUvπN
(y, x), since a small value of
χEU does not necessarily mean that the comparison of x and y is obvious. It may indeed result from the fact that the
two options x and y have relatively close marks.
Here HEU
wEU
(y, x) is signiﬁcantly larger than HEUvπN
(y, x) > 0. The fact that HEU
wEU
(y, x) is signiﬁcantly larger than zero
means that the positive arguments in favour of y are on average signiﬁcantly larger than the negative arguments. We
consider two subcases.
Firstly, we consider the case when ν is relatively small (say εν < ν < εν in practice, where εν is a parameter). The
explanation can thus be the following one:
y is preferred to x since the intensity of preference y over x on A+(y, x) is
significantly larger than the intensity of preference of x over y on A−(y, x),
and all the criteria have more or less the same weights.
There remains to consider the case when ν is large (say ν  εν in practice). Then from Proposition 15, quantity χ
EU
δ
is
large. The explanation can thus be the following one:
y is preferred to x since the intensity of preference y over x on A+(y, x) is much
larger than the intensity of preference of x over y on A−(y, x).
7.2. Weighted majority model
Lemma 6. One has for any v ∈ W(Maj)
HMaj
wMaj
(y, x) = 1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
HMajπ◦v(y, x).
Proposition 16. Consider two alternatives x, y ∈ X. We have
HMaj
wMaj
(y, x) HMajπN◦v(y, x).
Assume that
A+(y, x) = N, A−(y, x) = N and A=(y, x) = N. (8)
Then, HMajπN◦v(y, x) = HMajwMaj(y, x) if and only if v = wMaj .
Condition (8) means that x does not dominates strictly y on all criteria, y does not dominates strictly x on all criteria,
and x is not identical to y on all criteria.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the anchor ψRMG to be applied is that
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Lemma 4 when F =Maj follows from the ﬁrst part of Proposition 16.
Proposition 17. Let χMaj := |HMaj
wMaj
(x, y)− HMajvπN (x, y)|. Then for all i ∈ N∣∣∣∣vi − 1n
∣∣∣∣ 4n(n− 1)χMaj.
The explanation that can be generated is more or less similar to Section 7.1. We have the following cases.
• ν ≈ 0 (say ν  εν in practice). Hence HEUv is almost equal to the arithmetic mean HEUwEU . This means that y 
Maj
v x follows
from the relation y Maj
wEU
x. The explanation can thus be the following one:
y is preferred to x since there are more criteria for which y is better than x
than criteria for which x is better than y, and the aggregation model is almost
the majority rule.
• ν ≈ 0 (say ν > εν in practice). Proposition 17, quantity χMaj is not small. Hence HEUwMaj(y, x) is signiﬁcantly larger than
HMajπN◦v(y, x). Hence the decision made by the majority rule is very strong. The explanation tells just a little bit of the
speciﬁcities of x and y, namely
y is preferred to x since the criteria for which y is better than x are ON AVERAGE
MUCH stronger than the criteria for which x is better than y.
7.3. Pessimistic qualitative model
Lemma 4 when F = Pess follows from the following proposition.
Proposition 18. Let v ∈ W(Pess). If for every permutation π ∈ Π(N), hPessπ◦v(y) > hPessπ◦v(x) then
n∧
i=1
yi >
n∧
i=1
xi .
For w ∈ W(Pess), we have hPessw (z) = hPess,A
+(y,x)
w (z)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
w (z)∧ hPess,A
−(y,x)
w (z). We now give a characterization of
anchor ψRMG for the Pess model through the following three propositions.
Proposition 19. Let
E := {1} ∪ {xi: i ∈ A+(y, x)}∪ {1− vπ vN ( j): j ∈ {1, . . . , ∣∣A+(y, x)∣∣}}.
Let e be the median value of the discrete set E.
We have
∀π ∈ Π(N) hPess,A+(y,x)π◦v (x) e. (9)
Moreover, HPessπ◦v(y, x) > 0 for every π ∈ Π(N) if and only if the following three propositions hold:
(i) ∀π ∈ Π(N), hPess,A+(y,x)π◦v (y) > hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x),
(ii) ∀i ∈ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x), yi > e,
(iii) ∀π ∈ Π(N), hPessπ◦v(x) < hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (x)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x).
Proposition 20. Let i+ ∈ A+(y, x) such that ∧i∈A+(y,x) yi = yi+ . Let V i+ = {k ∈ N: 1 − vk  yi+}, and k+ ∈ Vi+ (deﬁned when
V i+ = ∅) such that 1− vk+ =
∧
k∈Vi+ (1− vk). The following two propositions are equivalent:
(i) ∀π ∈ Π(N), hPess,A+(y,x)π◦v (y) > hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x),
(ii) either V i+ = ∅ or
|Vi+| <
∣∣{ j ∈ A+(y, x): x j < 1− vk+}∣∣. (10)
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∧
j∈A−(y,x)∪A=(y,x) x j . Let
I = {i ∈ A+(y, x): xi < x j+}.
Then the following relations are equivalent:
∀π ∈ Π(N): hPessπ◦v(x) < hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (x)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x) (11)
and
I = ∅ and ∣∣{k ∈ N: 1− vk  x j+}∣∣< |I|. (12)
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for having y Pessπ◦v x for all π ∈ Π(N) is the satisfaction of both condition (ii) in
Proposition 19, condition (ii) in Proposition 20 and relation (12) in Proposition 21. From these properties, one can easily
check whether anchor ψRMG can be applied.
We are now interested in the generation of the explanation to the user. From Proposition 19, the three conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii) hold. According to Proposition 20, one has either Vi+ = ∅ or (10).
Assume ﬁrst that Vi+ = ∅. The worse scores of x on A+(y, x) are clearly smaller than yi+ . When Vi+ = ∅, there is no
weight that can hide the difference between the worst score yi+ of y on A
+(y, x) and the even worse score of x. This
means that all the weights are large enough, and thus that the aggregation function is close to the minimum. The ﬁrst part
of the explanation can thus be as follows:
y is preferred to x since there is no weight that can hide the worse score of x
compared to y on A+(y, x). [The aggregation function is almost the Minimum.] Recall
that y is strictly better than x on A+(y, x). . . .
The other case is when (10) holds. The set L := { j ∈ A+(y, x): x j < 1− vk+} contains the criteria in A+(y, x) for which x has
a very bad score. The set Vi+ gathers all the weights that can hide the worst score yi+ of y on A
+(y, x). If |Vi+| < |L|, then
there is at least one weight for which the worse score of x compared to y cannot be saved. The ﬁrst part of the explanation
can thus be as follows:
y is preferred to x since there is at least a weight that cannot hide the worse
scores of x compared to y on A+(y, x). [The aggregation function is close to the
Minimum.] Recall that y is strictly better than x on A+(y, x). . . .
The mid-part of the explanation concerns the point (ii) in Proposition 19. The overall score of x is lower than e. Thus y
is better than the overall utility of x, over A−(y, x) ∪ A=(y, x). The next part of the explanation can thus be the following
one:
. . . y is better than the overall score of x, on the criteria A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). Recall
that y is not better than x on the criteria A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). . . .
The last part of the explanation concerns the point (iii) in Proposition 19, and Proposition 21. From relation I = ∅, the
worse scores of x are attained in A+(y, x). From relation |{k ∈ N: 1− vk  x j+}| < |I|, there is at least one weight for which
the worse scores of x in A+(y, x) cannot be saved up to the scores of x on A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). The end of the explanation
can thus be as follows:
. . . Finally, the worse scores of x are attained in A+(y, x). There is at least one
weight for which the worse scores of x in A+(y, x) cannot be saved up to the scores
of x on A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). [The aggregation function is close to the Minimum.]
8. Illustration and experimental results
The aim of this section is threefold. Firstly, the process for generating the explanation is summarized in Section 8.1.
Secondly, we wish to show that our approach helps the user to better understand the decision than when he tries to
do it on his own. The anchors can be seen as meta-explanations or explanation schemas [57]. It aims at selecting the
decisive criteria in the comparison y Fv x. The decisive criteria are the most inﬂuencing criteria in the decision, and their
determination helps the user to better understand the decision and also to take actions on the decision such as improvement
actions. We illustrate how the anchors behave on several examples.
The illustrations focus on the two models EU and Pess. The reason why the model Maj is not considered is that the Maj
model can be seen as a particular case of the EU model applied to binary alternatives. Indeed, we have
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where x∗ and y∗ are deﬁned from x and y by the relations x∗i = 1 if xi  yi and x∗i = 0 otherwise, and y∗i = 1 if yi  xi and
y∗i = 0 otherwise.
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 discuss the two anchors ψNOA and ψIVT respectively, and show several illustrative examples. We
do not consider speciﬁcally the two other anchors ψALL and ψRMG since their interpretation is more straightforward and in
particular they do not require the selection of a subset of criteria. Moreover, Section 8.4 presents a comparative study of
several explanations on the three anchors ψNOA, ψIVT and ψRMG for the EU model.
The third aim of this section is to present some experimental results concerning the practical determination of the
explanation (see Section 8.5).
8.1. Generation process of the explanations
The generation of the explanation for a given instance (x, y, v) ∈ D(F) is obtained as follows. One aims at determining
a non-dominated element of Ex(x, y, v,F) w.r.t. .
Due to the lexicographic structure of  over Ex(x, y, v,F), one ﬁrst identiﬁes the anchor to be applied. The conditions
under which each anchor can be applied have been presented throughout this paper. More precisely, these are, for every
ψ ∈ Ψ , necessity and suﬃcient conditions on (x, y, v) to have (x, y, v) ∈ D(F ,ψ). We identify the most preferred anchor ψˆ
in the set {ψ ∈ Ψ : (x, y, v) ∈ D(F ,ψ)} according to .
Then we compute a non-dominated explanation set Aˆ in Ex(x, y, v,F , ψˆ) for this anchor ψˆ . This was presented in the
previous sections. Considering the EU model, it is trivial for the ψALL and ψRMG anchors, it requires to sort a vector for the
ψNOA anchor, and it is solved by Algorithm Algo-EU for the anchor ψIVT.
Finally, from (ψˆ, Aˆ), the corresponding textual explanation is generated. Examples of text have been presented earlier in
the paper.
8.2. Illustration of the anchor “not on average”
8.2.1. Model EU
Let us ﬁrst compare the Klein [35] approach with our. In our approach, a selected criterion i for anchor ψNOA necessarily
fulﬁls (vi − 1n )i > 0 (see Proposition 1). A criterion is likely to be selected if it is a negative and weak argument, or if it
is a positive and strong argument. On the other hand, in the Klein approach, the criteria for which |i | ≈ 0 and vi ≈ 0 are
unlikely to be selected.
There are three main situations in which the two approaches give different results. The ﬁrst two ones are not speciﬁc to
the anchor ψNOA while the third one is speciﬁc to this anchor. In the ﬁrst one, criterion i is a weak and negative argument. It
is very intuitive to show such a criterion. Our approach selects this criterion while Klein’s approach usually does not. In the
second situation, criterion i is a strong and negative argument. Klein’s approach selects this criterion while ours does not.
This non-decisive criterion is compensated by positive arguments since y is after all preferred to x. Hence, it is not necessary
at all to show this criterion to the user in a synthesis. In the last situation, criterion i is a medium argument (vi ≈ 1n ) with|i |  0. Klein’s approach often selects this criterion while ours usually does not. The strength of the argument corresponds
to the reference weight 1n that one might have in mind. Since it is not different from the prior, it is not useful to show it
explicitly to the user. It is better to focus on the criteria that have less standard weights (very small or large).
We now give several examples to illustrate the main properties of our approach. As shown in Example 5, our approach
selects very few arguments (only one in Example 5) when the decision is clear cut. On the opposite side, when the decision
is very tight, more criteria are selected with our approach (see Example 6). It is indeed intuitive that the tighter the decision,
the more arguments are selected. This does not occur with the Klein approach (see Examples 5 and 6). Other examples with
more criteria can be found in Section 8.4
Example 5 (The decision is relatively clear-cut, and the two approaches select opposite arguments). Consider the situation where
x = (0.42,0.66,0.66,0.57), y = (0.54,0.04,0.89,0.76) and v = (0.41,0.06,0.24,0.29). Then  = (0.12,−0.62,0.23,0.19).
y is signiﬁcantly preferred to x since hEUv (y) = 0.66 and hEUv (x) = 0.54.
Criteria 1 2 3 4
(vi − 1n )×i 0.019 0.118 −0.002 0.008
compeli = vi |i | 0.049 0.037 0.055 0.055
The Klein approach selects most of the arguments in this case – namely criteria 1, 3 and 4 – even though the decision is
relatively clear-cut. On the other hand, our approach selects only one argument – namely criterion 2 – which is enough in
this example. Looking at the example, criterion 2 is indeed the main argument why x is better on average than y but y is
preferred to x with the decision model.
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y = (0.3,0.37,0.41,0.94,0.49) and v = (0.18,0.11,0.12,0.24,0.35). Then  = (−0.65,−0.3,−0.23,0.67,0.1). y is just
slightly preferred to x since hEUv (y) = 0.54 and hEUv (x) = 0.52.
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5
(vi − 1n )×i 0.013 0.027 0.018 0.027 0.015
compeli 0.117 0.033 0.028 0.161 0.035
The Klein approach selects criteria 1 and 4. On the other hand, in our approach, criteria 2,3,4,5 are selected.
8.2.2. Model Pess
Several examples are given. Example 7 illustrates the case when M∗ = ∅. This example shows that when the decision is
clear-cut, the number of selected criteria is small. The more general case M∗ = ∅ is represented by Example 8.
Example 7 (Clear-cut decision with 10 criteria). Consider the following values of x, y and v .
y = (0.1,0.,0.66,0.97,0.45,0.71,0.57,0.77,0.09,0.69),
x= (0.14,0.46,0.26,0.8,0.69,0.64,0.07,0.17,0.94,0.45),
v = (0.13,0.53,0.45,0.12,0.83,0.57,1.0,0.19,0.58,0.23).
We have hPessv (x) = 0.07, hPessv (y) = 0.42 and y Pessv x. The selected criterion is 2. Moreover, criterion kx = 7 is decisive since
the worse score of x is reached on this criterion, it is a positive and strong argument. We have M = {2} and M∗ = ∅. The
generic text can be generated from S , kx and M∗ . The last sentence in this generic explanation text is: “y is suﬃciently good
on the remaining criteria 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10”. We remark that the scores of y on the two criteria 1 and 9 are not good (0.1
and 0.09) but they are larger than the over score hPessv (x) = 0.07 of x. The decision would not have changed if the weight
wPessi = 1 were assigned to the criteria 1 and 9. It turns out that these two criteria have a medium importance, which
implies that the overall score of y is much larger than that of x. But it is not necessary to show this in the explanation.
Example 8 (Tight decision with 10 criteria). Consider the following values of x, y and v .
y = (0.36,0.01,0.22,0.11,0.61,0.4,0.06,0.07,0.43,0.61),
x= (0.25,0.21,0.14,0.08,0.53,0.15,0.2,0.53,0.87,0.75),
v = (1.0,0.02,0.86,0.23,0.91,0.53,0.36,0.17,0.26,0.53).
We have hPessv (x) = 0.14, hPessv (y) = 0.22 and y Pessv x. The selected criteria are 2,7,8. Moreover, kx = 3, M = {2,4,7,8} and
M∗ = {4}. Indeed, the worse score of x is reached on this criterion 4, which is a positive and strong argument.
8.3. Illustration of the anchor “invert”
8.3.1. Model EU
In most of the cases that we have encountered, the cycles of a minimal permutation are of cardinality 2. A cycle of size 3
is presented in Example 9. The second example contains 10 criteria. It is also possible to consider all the explanation sets
of minimal cardinality in order to generate the textual explanation (see Example 15 later).
Example 9 (Permutation between three criteria). Let x = (0.89,0.03,0.07,0.32,0.38), y = (0.36,0.76,0.6,0.25,0.75) and
v = (0.06,0.11,0.21,0.29,0.33). Then we have  = (−0.53,0.73,0.53,−0.07,0.37). We have compel= (0.031,0.08,0.111,
0.02,0.122). The Klein approach selects criteria 5 and 3. On the other hand, the minimal element in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) is
{{1,3,5}}. For the associated permutation π , the score of criteria 1, 5 and 3 are assigned to the weight of criteria 5, 3 and 1
respectively (i.e. π(5) = 1, π(3) = 5 and π(1) = 3). We note that π is the most disfavourable permutation for y on {1,3,5}.
It is easy to see that R∗ = {(1,3), (1,5)}. Finally, CPS = {3,5}, CNW = {1}, and the other sets of the tuple C are empty (see
Section 6.1).
Example 10 (Example with 10 criteria). Let
y = (0.45,0.64,0.86,0.76,0.87,0.54,0.17,0.04,0.55,0.05),
x= (0.61,0.28,0.08,0.02,0.81,0.15,0.16,0.38,0.24,0.75),
 = (−0.16,0.36,0.78,0.74,0.06,0.39,0.01,−0.34,0.31,−0.7),
v = (0.13,0.04,0.12,0.1,0.07,0.19,0.15,0.03,0.01,0.16).
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10, 3, 6 and 4. On the other hand, in our approach, the explanation set is {{6,8}, {3,9}}. Regarding the pair {6,8}, criterion 6
is positive and important and criterion 8 is negative and not important. Regarding the pair {3,9}, both criteria are positive
arguments, and criterion 3 is more positive and more important than criterion 9. Criterion 9 is not mentioned. Finally,
CPS = {3,6}, CNW = {8}, and the other sets of the tuple C are empty.
8.3.2. Model Pess
The following examples illustrate different situations regarding the size of the minimal explanation sets: the minimal
explanation set is composed of one subset of cardinality 3 in Example 11, and of two subsets of cardinality 2 in Example 12.
Example 11 (A selected set of cardinality 3). Let y = (0.83,0.66,0.19,0.55,0.94,0.75), x = (0.63,0.0,0.15,0.98,0.97,0.81)
and v = (0.82,0.8,1.0,0.1,0.28,0.26). We have y Pessv x. The minimum selected coalitions in Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψIVT) are of
cardinality 3: {{2,3,4}}, {{2,3,5}} and {{2,3,6}}. We note that criteria 2 and 3 are present in all three selected sets. These
two criteria are positive arguments with a large weight. The overall score of x and y is attained at criterion 3 that has a
very large importance. The other criteria 4, 5 and 6 that appear in the selected criteria are negative arguments with a small
weight.
Example 12 (Example with 9 criteria). Consider the following values of x, y and v .
y = (0.43,0.57,0.28,0.5,0.46,0.3,0.6,0.48,0.83),
x= (0.05,0.89,0.22,0.0,0.82,0.74,0.86,0.17,0.76),
v = (1.0,0.7,0.67,0.29,0.27,0.29,0.78,0.87,0.67).
We have y Pessv x. The selected set is composed of two cycles: {{1,2}, {6,8}}. In the cycle {1,2}, criterion 1 is a positive
argument with a very large importance, and criterion 2 is a negative argument with an importance lower than that of
criterion 1. Moreover, the overall score of x is attained at the very important criterion 1 for which x has a very small score.
Concerning the cycle {6,8}, criterion 6 is a negative argument with a small weight and criterion 8 is a positive argument
with a large weight. The explanation says that criterion 1 that is a positive argument is more important than criterion 2
that is a negative argument, and criterion 8 that is a positive argument is more important than criterion 6 that is a negative
argument. Finally, on the remaining criteria, y has rather good evaluations.
8.4. Comparison of several anchors on the EU model
In order to compare the anchors, we ﬁx the two vectors x and y, and we will consider different values of the weight v .
Clearly, if anchor ψALL holds for one weight vector v , then this anchor also holds for any other value of v . Hence, we focus
on the three other anchors ψNOA, ψIVT and ψRMG. We consider the following values of x and y
y = (0.99,0.35,0.31,0.51,0.62,0.57,0.52),
x= (0.5,0.06,0.03,0.95,0.87,0.2,0.95).
Option y is on average better than x. The following examples of v are given.
Example 13 (Anchor ψNOA). Let v = (0.06,0.11,0.19,0.11,0.31,0.08,0.14). Option x is preferred to y. The Klein approach
selects the criteria 5 and 7. The selected criteria for this anchor are the criteria 1 and 5. Criterion 1 is a weak and negative
argument, and criterion 5 is a positive and strong argument. The other criteria are not explicitly mentioned since their
importance are relatively close to the mean importance 1n .
Example 14 (Anchor ψNOA). Let v = (0.14,0.05,0.17,0.23,0.17,0.11,0.13). Option x is preferred to y. The Klein approach
highlights the criteria 4 and 1. Our approach selects the criteria 2 and 4. Criterion 2 is a weak and negative argument, and
criterion 4 is a positive and strong argument. The other criteria have, as in the previous case, an importance that is close to
the mean importance 1n , and are thus not explicitly mentioned.
Example 15 (Anchor ψIVT). Let v = (0.11,0.14,0.13,0.02,0.27,0.25,0.08). Option y is preferred to x. The Klein approach
highlights the criteria 6 and 5. There are two elements of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) of cardinality 2: {{4,6}} and {{6,7}}. In the
selection {4,6}, criterion 6 is a positive and strong argument, and criterion 4 is a very weak and negative argument. We
note that criterion 6 also belongs to the second selection and that criterion 7 in the second selection is a weak and negative
argument. At the end, the three criteria 4, 6 and 7 are displayed in the explanation.
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Example 16 (Anchor ψIVT). Let v = (0.24,0.2,0.25,0.06,0.02,0.19,0.04). Option y is preferred to x. The Klein approach
highlights the criteria 1 and 6. The preferred explanation set in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) is {{1,7}, {3,4}}. In the pair {1,7},
criterion 1 is a positive and strong argument, and criterion 7 is a weak and negative argument. In the pair {3,4}, criterion
3 is a positive and strong argument, and criterion 4 is a weak and negative argument. The four criteria 1, 3, 4 and 7 are
displayed in the explanation.
Example 17 (Anchor ψRMG). Let v = (0.16,0.14,0.15,0.1,0.16,0.15,0.14). Option y is preferred to x. The Klein approach
selects the criteria 1 and 7. We are in the situation of Interpretation 6: the intensity of preference of y over x on the
positive criteria 1, 2, 3 and 6 is signiﬁcantly larger than the intensity of preference of x over y on the negative criteria 4, 5
and 7. Moreover, all the criteria have more or less the same weights.
Example 18 (Anchor ψRMG). Let v = (0.12,0.16,0.15,0.16,0.15,0.14,0.12). Option y is preferred to x. The Klein approach
selects the criteria 4 and 1. We are in the situation of Interpretation 5. Compared to the previous situation, the weights are
closer to the arithmetic mean. Even though y is on average signiﬁcantly better than x, we do not need to use this argument
here.
We have seen that the three anchors are triggered for different values of v . The seven criteria have been selected in the
previous examples for the anchors ψNOA and ψIVT. This shows the inﬂuence of the weights on the selection process.
8.5. Experimental results
We present in this section the results of experimentations conducted on our approach. The tests are mainly concerned
with the computational performance of the determination of a non-dominated explanation set. Among the three models EU,
Maj and Pess, we restrict ourselves to the case of the EU model. We have seen that the methods and algorithms that select
an explanation set are very similar for the two models EU and Maj. Hence it is not necessary to perform an experiment on
both models. Moreover, the determination of a non-dominated explanation set can be almost done by hand for the model
Pess (see the end of Section 6.3), and requires thus less computation time.
The computation that is necessary to determine a non-dominated explanation set is not time consuming for the anchors
ψALL, ψNOA and ψRMG since one needs at most to sort a vector of n components. By contrast, Algorithm Algo-EU used in
anchor ψIVT requires the search of the explanation among a large tree. The computation time is thus shown only for the
anchor ψIVT.
Our approach has been implemented in Java and tested on an Intel Pentium Core 2 computer with 2.66 GHz. The
experimentations are performed on randomly generated instances from the set D(EU). Fig. 1 shows the percentage of
occurrence of each anchor in the experiment. Concerning Algorithm Algo-EU, the mean execution time is given. To analyse
the eﬃciency of the branching strategy of this algorithm, Fig. 1 also indicates the mean percentage of the tree that is
explored during the search. We have noticed that the algorithm often terminates at the ﬁrst iteration. This situation arises
when {T1} is an explanation set, where T1 is the smallest element of S according to lexi. Fig. 1 presents the results for
values of n between 4 and 20. These are the most commonly encountered values for the number of attributes, in practice.
According to Fig. 1, the algorithm terminates at the very ﬁrst coalition in S , in at least one case over two. This shows that
the strategy that was chosen for the ranking of the coalitions of S according to lexi is eﬃcient. Moreover, the percentage
of the search tree that is explored by the algorithm decreases very rapidly with n. The worse scenario in Algorithm Algo-EU
occurs when the only explanation set is the grand coalition N , that is for a permutation π such that A(π) = {N}. In this
case, the 2|S| subsets of S , where |S| 2n − 1, are explored before ﬁnding the explanation set.
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ψALL is 12n−1 and thus decreases very rapidly with n. For larger values of n, the preponderant case becomes anchor ψIVT.
If ν > 1n , the weight vector v is clearly not close to the reference weight w
EU. Concerning the anchor ψRMG, we have
obtained a good separation of the three sub-cases on this anchor with the values εν = 0.15n and εν = 0.3n .
9. Conclusion
We propose an approach to select the arguments to be used in the explanation of the prescription made by a multi-
attribute decision model parameterized by weights assigned to the criteria. It is based on the analysis of the values of the
weights together with the relative scores of the options to be compared. The general approach is applied on three decision
models: the expected utility model (EU), the weighted majority model (Maj) and the weighted minmax model (Pess). These
three models are the most well-known weight-based models in decision theory. Moreover, they represent very different
visions of decision theory.
The idea of our approach is to look for some changes in the weight vector v that yield an inversion of the prescription
made by the decision model. The explanation focuses then on the criteria for which the weight vector has changed. The
remaining criteria do not play any role in the inversion of the prescription and are thus not mentioned in the explanation.
Not any change of the weights can be used since this change shall be explainable to the user. In this paper, two strategies for
the modiﬁcation of the weights are considered: the replacement of v by some reference weights wF , and a permutation of
the weights v among the criteria. These two strategies lead to two different explanation strategies. They are called anchors
ψNOA and ψIVT respectively.
There are several possible changes of the weights compatible to each anchor. All these admissible changes can be repre-
sented in a single combinatorial structure Ex(x, y, v,F) containing all explanation sets. Since one is interested in the simplest
explanation, the simplest changes are sought. In the structure Ex(x, y, v,F), this is expressed by an order relation . One
then looks at the non-dominated elements of Ex(x, y, v,F), in the sense of .
The properties of the non-dominated explanation sets have been studied for the two anchors ψNOA and ψIVT. Concerning
anchor ψNOA, we have shown, for the three models EU, Maj and Pess, that the positive selected arguments turn out to
be strong and the negative selected arguments are weak. Moreover, the selected arguments for the qualitative Pess model
are necessarily negative. This comes from the fact that the min operator expresses the principle of elimination among the
criteria. An explanation can then easily be generated from these properties. The computation of a particular non-dominated
explanation set is easy since one needs only to rank a vector. Concerning anchor ψIVT, we obtain roughly the same idea but
in a weaker form. More precisely, the allocation of the weights to the criteria is not the most unfavourable one relatively to
an inversion of the prescription, for the models EU and Maj. This implies that the positive arguments have more important
weights than the negative arguments. A branch and bound algorithm has been proposed to compute a particular non-
dominated explanation set. The underlying combinatorial structure is large since it is isomorphic to the set of coalition
structures. In the algorithm, the coalition structures with coalitions of small cardinality are explored ﬁrst. Experimental
tests have shown that this strategy enables to ﬁnd very quickly the explanation set in most of the cases.
The two anchors ψNOA and ψIVT do not cover all cases of (x, y, v) ∈ D(F). Another case, which is the simplest one (ψALL),
occurs when there is only positive arguments. The explanation does not need to mention the speciﬁcities of the decision
model in this trivial situation. The last case (ψRMG) gathers all the situations not covered by the other anchors. Interestingly
enough, we were able to divide D(F ,ψIVT) in very few typical sub-cases. For instance, for the EU model, either the weights
are close to the reference weights, or there are clearly more positive arguments than negative ones.
We have shown through numerous illustrative examples, that the explanation that is generated really helps to understand
the decision. This comes from the fact that our approach selects the decisive criteria, that is the criteria for which a given
change in the weight switches the decision. The type of relevant change is dependant on the anchor.
This work could beneﬁt from several extensions. First of all, our framework could be applied to other weight-based
decision models. An example of such model is the weighted maxmin function [22]. This model is the optimistic counterpart
of the weighted minmax function hPess. Some preliminary results were given in [39] and suggest that the extension of
our approach is possible for this model. Secondly, the approach could also be extended to models using more complex
parameters than a simple weight assigned to each criterion. One may think of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals which
extend the EU and Pess models respectively [15,53]. The parameters of these discrete integrals correspond to the concept of
a capacity, which contains 2n coeﬃcients [15]. The generation of an explanation for the Choquet integral w.r.t. a particular
case of a capacity were already addressed but it needs to be further studied [38,43].
In this paper, we have not put our attention in this paper to the structuration and expression of the selected arguments.
The textual explanations that we proposed throughout this paper were given only to show the type of explanation that each
anchor yields. This can be improved by incorporating dedicated techniques for the generation of natural language.
The explanations resulting from our approach aim at ﬁnding the very arguments that are at the root of the prescription.
The explanation that we produce is more complex than that generated in [14,35,43], but our explanation reasoning is more
sound. We analyse more deeply the speciﬁcity of the model and deduce from that the set of selected arguments. For this
reason, our approach is more suited to applications where a high added-value of the decision model is expected. This
means that the recipients of this approach are more domain experts than simple users of the Internet. To cite an example
of application, one can mention the decision aid for the selection of candidate architectural options in the design of complex
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far from being complex for the EU and Maj models. An interesting property of our framework is indeed that the explanation
adapts itself automatically to the complexity of the prescription. On the other hand, the explanation is more complex for the
Pess model. The min and max binary operators are extensions of the Boolean AND and OR operator on non-Boolean spaces.
The weighted minmax can thus be seen as a complex condition combining many AND and OR operators. This indicates
why the explanation is complex and needs many arguments. An extension of this work could be to generate a simpliﬁed
explanation for this model.
10. Proofs
10.1. Proof of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. In order to compute the maximum and minimum values of each component of the elements of the
polytope VEU(y, x), it is enough to consider its vertices since VEU(y, x) is a polytope [16]. First of all, the following set{
w ∈ W(EU): ∀i ∈ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x) wi = 0
}
is included in VEU(y, x). Hence, when |A+(y, x)| > 1, the set admissible values of the weight wi , with i ∈ A+(y, x), is the
[0,1] interval.
For ε > 0, let Uε be the set of w ∈ Rn deﬁned by n + 1 inequalities w1  0, . . . , wn  0 and ∑k∈N kwk  ε, and one
equality
∑
k∈N wk = 1. Then VEU(y, x) =
⋃
ε>0 Uε . A point w ∈ Uε is a vertex of Uε if and only if n − 1 inequalities are
replaced by the corresponding equalities [16, Theorem 18.1]. Let {i, j} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n + 1} be the index of the two inequalities
that are not transformed into equalities.
The ﬁrst case is when {i, j} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}. For ε small enough, one necessarily has i ∈ A+(y, x) and j ∈ A−(y, x). From the
relations +i wi −−j w j = ε and wi + w j = 1, we obtain
wi =
−j + ε
+i +−j
, w j = 
+
i − ε
+i +−j
and ∀k ∈ N \ {i, j} wk = 0.
The second case arises when j = n+ 1. We obtain
i ∈ A+(y, x), wi = 1 and ∀k ∈ N \ {i} wk = 0.
Assume that A+(y, x) = ∅ and A−(y, x) = ∅. Hence wi ∈ [min j∈A−(y,x) 
−
j +ε
+i +−j
,1] for all i ∈ A+(y, x), and w j ∈
[0,maxi∈A+(y,x) 
+
i −ε
+i +−j
] for all j ∈ A−(y, x). The lemma is shown since this relations hold for all ε > 0. By construction, the
boundaries of the intervals are reached so that the intervals are sharp. 
10.2. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 2. The only if part of the lemma is clear. Let us show the if part. Consider thus S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψNOA),
and assume thus that (3) holds.
When F = EU, we show in the proof of Proposition 1 that if (3) holds, then we have (vk − 1n )k > 0 for all k ∈ S . Let
T ⊆ S with T = S . For k ∈ S \ T , we have from (13)
HEU
(vT ,wEUN\T )
(y, x) = HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x)−
∑
i∈S\(T∪{k})
(
vi − 1
n
)
i .
By (3), HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) 0. We conclude that HEU
(vT ,wEUN\T )
(y, x) < 0 and thus T /∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA). This proves that
the coalitions satisfying (3) are necessary minimal in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA).
The proof is similar when F =Maj, thanks to the relation (14) given below.
Lastly, consider the case when F = Pess. Let T ⊆ S with T = S . From (3), we have hPess
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(x) 
hPess
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(y) for all k ∈ S \ T . Lemma 7 (shown below) holds with the strict inequalities are replaced by non-strict
inequalities. We obtain thus∧
k∈S\T
hPess
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(x)
∧
k∈S\T
hPess
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(y).
For every z ∈ X ,
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k∈S\T
hPess
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(z) =
∧
i∈T
(
zi ∨ (1− vi)
)∧∧
i /∈S
zi ∧
∧
k∈S\T
[(
zk ∨ (1− vk)
)∧ zk]
=
∧
i∈T
(
zi ∨ (1− vi)
)∧∧
i /∈S
zi ∧
∧
k∈S\T
zk
= hPess
(vT ,w
Maj
N\T )
(z).
Hence we conclude that
hPess
(vT ,w
Maj
N\T )
(x) hPess
(vT ,w
Maj
N\T )
(y).
This proves that T /∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) be minimal, and k ∈ S . Clearly, (3) is satisﬁed. Hence HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x) > 0
and HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) 0, which gives HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x)− HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) > 0. From the relation
HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x)− HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) =
(
vk − 1n
)
k (13)
we can infer that (vk − 1n )k > 0. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The integer p as deﬁned in Proposition 2 exists since N ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) and ∅ /∈ Ex(x, y, v,
EU,ψNOA). We set S = {π(p), . . . ,π(n)}. Let k ∈ S . We write
HEU
(v S\{k},wEU(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) = HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x)−
(
vk − 1n
)
k by (13)
 HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x)−
(
vπ(p) − 1
n
)
π(p) since π
−1(k) p
= HEU
(v S\{π(p)},wEU(N\S)∪{π(p)})
(y, x)
+
(
HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x)− HEU
(v S\{π(p)},wEU(N\S)∪{π(p)})
(y, x)−
(
vπ(p) − 1
n
)
π(p)
)
= HEU
(v S\{π(p)},wEU(N\S)∪{π(p)})
(y, x) by (13)
 0
since S \ {π(p)} /∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA). Hence S is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA).
By (13), we have for every S ⊆ N
HEU
(v S ,wEUN\S )
(y, x) = HEUwEU(y, x)+
∑
k∈S
(
vk − 1n
)
k.
By deﬁnition of p, it is clear that S is the set with the smallest cardinality for which
∑
k∈S(vk − 1n )k > −HEUwEU (y, x). Hence
there is no minimal element of Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψNOA) with a strictly lower cardinality than S . 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Maj,ψNOA) be minimal and k ∈ S . We have
HMaj
(v S ,w
Maj
N\S )
(y, x)− HMaj
(v S\{k},wMaj(N\S)∪{k})
(y, x) =
(
vk − 1n
)
sgnk . (14)
Hence the result is shown thanks to (3). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Thanks to (14), the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA) be minimal. Let k ∈ S . We set a =∧i∈S\{k}(yi ∨ (1− vi))∧∧i /∈S yi and
b =∧i∈S\{k}(xi ∨ (1− vi))∧∧i /∈S xi . We obtain by (3)
a∧ (yk ∨ (1− vk))> b ∧ (xk ∨ (1− vk)),
a∧ yk  b ∧ xk.
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a standard reasoning on the inequalities. However, it is tedious, lengthy and not always easy. We propose rather to make
a systematic check of all possible cases of comparison between the variables a, b, xk , yk , 1 − vk . Since the previous two
relations contain only the min and max operators, their analysis does not depend on the numerical values of a, b, xk ,
yk , 1 − vk , but only on their relative ordering. Hence, this can be performed by a computer. As a result, we generate by
computer all possible comparisons (lower, equal or greater) among the variables a, b, xk , yk , 1 − vk , and see whether the
previous two inequalities are satisﬁed. At the end, for every pair of variables, we analyse which comparisons between these
two variables are compatible with the two inequalities. Considering for instance the two variables a and b, the outcome is
either no relation between a and b, or one of the following comparisons: a < b, a b, a = b, a  b or a > b. This approach
has been also used in the proof of Proposition 12. We obtain the following invariant comparisons
yk  b < {a,1− vk} and yk  xk
where the notation b < {a,1− vk} means that b < a and b < 1− vk .
Hence k ∈ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). Applying this relation for all k ∈ S , we obtain S ⊆ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x). Since yk < 1− vk ,
k is a weak negative argument.
We have two cases:
(i) S is of cardinality 1: S = {k}. Then
yk ∨ (1− vk) 1− vk > b =
∧
i /∈S
xi,
∧
i /∈S
yi = a > b =
∧
i /∈S
xi .
(ii) S is of cardinality at least 2. Since a > b, one has∧
i∈S\{k}
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)∧∧
i /∈S
yi >
∧
i∈S\{k}
(
xi ∨ (1− vi)
)∧∧
i /∈S
xi .
Since yi  xi for all i ∈ S , one has (see Lemma 7)∧
i∈S\{k}
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)

∧
i∈S\{k}
(
xi ∨ (1− vi)
)
.
Hence for all k ∈ S∧
i /∈S
xi <
∧
i /∈S
yi and
∧
i /∈S
xi <
∧
i∈S\{k}
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)
.
This gives∧
i /∈S
xi <
∧
k∈S
∧
i∈S\{k}
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)=∧
i∈S
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)
.
In both cases, we have∧
i /∈S
xi <
∧
i /∈S
yi and
∧
i /∈S
xi <
∧
i∈S
(
yi ∨ (1− vi)
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that hPessv (x) is attained at k
x ∈ N . Since hPessv (y) > hPessv (x), we have in particular ykx ∨ (1−
vkx ) > xkx ∨ (1− vkx ). We obtain a contradiction if ykx  1− vkx . Hence ykx > 1− vkx . Furthermore, ykx > xkx .
Moreover, for k ∈ M , we have yk ∨ (1− vk) > xkx ∨ (1− vkx ) and thus 1− vk > xkx ∨ (1− vkx ).
Let S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA) be minimal, and assume that S \ M = ∅. Let k ∈ S \ M . Then yk > hPessv (x). We have
hPess
(v S\{k},wPess(N\S)∪{k})
(y) = hPess
(v S ,wPessN\S )
(y) ∧ yk . Since S ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA), we have hPess(v S ,wPessN\S )(y) > h
Pess
(v S ,wPessN\S )
(x). Since S is
minimal, by Proposition 5, hPess
(v S ,wPessN\S )
(x) =∧i∈N\S xi , and yk > hPessv (x) = hPess,N\Sv (x)∧i∈N\S xi . Hence
hPess
(v S\{k},wPess(N\S)∪{k})
(y) >
∧
i∈N\S
xi .
Since k ∈ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x), xk  yk >∧i∈N\S xi , we have ∧i∈N\S xi =∧i∈(N\S)∪{k} xi . Therefore
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(v S\{k},wPess(N\S)∪{k})
(y) >
∧
i∈(N\S)∪{k}
xi  hPess(v S\{k},wPess(N\S)∪{k})
(x).
Hence S \ {k} ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA), which contradicts the fact that S is minimal. We conclude that S ⊆ M . 
Proof of Proposition 7. By deﬁnition S := {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (p)} ∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA) and {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (p − 1)} /∈
Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA). To show that S is minimal, we need to show that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , p − 2}, D := S \ {π yN (i)} /∈
Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA).
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , p − 2}. Set C = {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (i − 1)}, C ′ = D \ C . One has C /∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA). Moreover,∧
j∈N\C y j = yπ yN (i) and thus
hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(y) =
∧
j∈C
(
y j ∨ (1− v j)
)∧ yπ yN (i)
and
hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(y) =
∧
j∈C
(
y j ∨ (1− v j)
)∧ yπ yN (i) ∧
∧
j∈C ′
(
y j ∨ (1− v j)
)
.
Hence
hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(y) hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(y).
Furthermore for any option z, relation C ⊆ D implies the following inequality
hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(z) hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(z). (15)
Applying that to z = y, we conclude that
hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(y) = hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(y).
Since C /∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA), and by (15) applied to x, we get
hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(x) hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(x)
 hPess
(vC ,wPessN\C )
(y)
= hPess
(vD ,wPessN\D )
(y).
Hence D /∈ Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA). This proves that {π yN (1), . . . ,π yN (p)} is minimal in Ex(x, y, v,Pess,ψNOA). 
10.3. Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 8. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,F ,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of . Let π ∈ Π(N) such that A ⊆ A(π). Then
x F(π◦vA,vN\A) y. Assume by contradiction that there exists S ∈ A with |S| = 1. The condition |S| = 1 implies that π(i) = i
for i ∈ S . Hence xF(π◦vA\{S},v(N\A\{S}) y. This contradicts the minimality of A since A \ {S}A and A \ {S} ⊆ A(π). 
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is done by induction on s = |S|. Let HSw :=
∑
i∈S wii for w ∈ W(EU).
When s = 2, we have
HSπ S◦v − HSπ S◦v = (vπ vS (1)πS (1) + vπ vS (2)πS (2))− (vπ vS (2)πS (1) + vπ vS (1)πS (2))
= (vπ vS (2) − vπ vS (1))× (πS (2) −πS (1)) 0.
Hence the result is proved when s = 2.
Assume that the result is shown for all subsets of cardinality strictly lower than s. Let S ⊆ N with |S| = s.
Let π ∈ Π(S). Deﬁne σ = π ◦ (π S )−1, k = πS (s) and k′ = π vS (s) = π S(k). Value k is the largest number in the set
{i: i ∈ S}, and vk′ is the largest number in the set {vi: i ∈ S}. Deﬁne σ ′ ∈ Π(S) by σ ′(k′) = k′ , σ ′(σ−1(k′)) = σ(k′), and
σ ′(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ S \ {k′, σ−1(k′)} (see Fig. 2). Set π ′ = σ ′ ◦π S ∈ Π(S).
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Fig. 3. Description of π and π ′ .
One has
HSπ◦v =
∑
i∈S
vπ(i)i =
∑
i∈S
vσ◦π S (i)i =
∑
i∈{1,...,s}
vσ◦π vS (i)πS (i).
Let i1 = (π vS )−1(k′) = s and i2 = (π vS )−1(σ−1(k′)). Hence
HSπ ′◦v − HSπ◦v = vσ ′◦π vS (i1)πS (i1) + vσ ′◦π vS (i2)πS (i2) − vσ◦π vS (i1)πS (i1) − vσ◦π vS (i2)πS (i2)
= (vk′ − vσ (k′))× (k −πS (i2)) 0
by deﬁnition of k and k′ .
Moreover, HSπ S◦v and H
S
π ′◦v have the same value vk′k on criterion k. Hence H
S
π S◦v − HSπ ′◦v = H
S\{k}
π S◦v − H
S\{k}
π ′◦v . By the
induction assumption, HS\{k}π S◦v  H
S\{k}
π ′◦v . Hence we have shown that
HSπ S◦v  H
S
π ′◦v  HSπ◦v .
Similarly, one can show that HSπ S◦v  H
S
π◦v . Hence the induction assumption holds at s. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Let A ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) be minimal in the sense of . Let π ∈ Π(N) such that xEU(π◦vA,vN\A) y
and A ⊆ A(π). Since x EU(π◦vA,vN\A) y, one can choose π in such a way that for all i ∈ N \ A, π(i) = i. Hence (π ◦ vA,
vN\A) = π ◦ v .
Let S ∈ A. By Proposition 8, we have |S| 2.
Let k, j ∈ S with k = j. Let π ′ ∈ Π(N) be deﬁned by π ′( j) = π(k), π ′(k) = π( j) and π ′(l) = π(l) for l ∈ N \ {k, j} (see
Fig. 3).
Clearly, A(π ′)A(π). Let A′ = (A\ {S})∪{S ′, S ′′} where S ′ = { j,π ′( j),π ′ ◦π ′( j), . . .} and S ′′ = {k,π ′(k),π ′ ◦π ′(k), . . .}
are the cycles of π ′ containing j and k respectively. One clearly has A′  A and A′ ⊆ A(π ′). Hence in order that A is
a minimal element, one shall have A′ /∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT). Hence, we have either y EUπ ′◦v x or y EU(π ′◦vA′ ,vN\A′ ) x. Since
A = A′ and π ′(l) = l for all l ∈ N \ A = N \ A′ , we have π ′ ◦ v = (π ′ ◦ vA′ , vN\A′ ). Hence in both case, we have y EUπ ′◦v x.
To sum-up, we have
xEUπ◦v y and y EUπ ′◦v x. (16)
We obtain from (16)
0< HEUπ ′◦v(y, x)− HEUπ◦v(y, x) = (vπ( j) − vπ(k))× (k − j).
Therefore (4) holds.
From (4), πS (l)
= πS (l+1) , for all l ∈ {1, . . . , |S| − 1}. Hence πS (l) < πS (l+1) . By (4), the previous relation implies
that vπ◦πS (l) > vπ◦πS (l+1) , for all l ∈ {1, . . . , |S| − 1}. Hence (5) holds. We have vπ vS (1)  · · ·  vπ vS (|S|) . We conclude that
π( j) = π S( j) for all j ∈ S .
Finally, the last inequality in the proposition follows from relation (5) and Lemma 3. 
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B = ∅ at every step of the search. This implies that the search tree is never pruned (step “Bounding”) and thus all the
subsets of elements of S are explored in the search. This means that there does not exist A ∈ Ex composed of elements of
S such that ∑S∈A DEUS  HEUv (y, x). Hence there does not exist π ∈ Π(N) such that HEUπ◦v(y, x)  0. This contradicts the
basic assumption made at the beginning of Section 6.
When the bounding condition is triggered in Algo-EU, we have A ∪ {Ti} discri B. Since discri is a complete order, we
conclude that B discri A ∪ {Ti}. In the combinatorial structure Ex endowed with discri, the whole sub-tree under the node
A ∪ {Ti} in the search (in Algo(A,B,k) after iteration i) can indeed be pruned since the elements of Ex in the sub-tree are
of the form A ∪ {Ti1 } ∪ · · · ∪ {Tim }, with m 1 and Ti discri Ti1 . By the relation
B discri A ∪ {Ti}discri A ∪ {Ti} ∪ {Ti1} ∪ · · · ∪ {Tim }
one sees that there is no way a strictly better argumentation set in Ex can be found under the node A ∪ {Ti}. We have
shown that the bounding condition is justiﬁed in the algorithm.
Assume that the algorithm terminates and returns B. We deﬁne π ∈ Π(N) as π(i) = π S (i) for all i ∈ S and all S ∈ B,
and π(i) = i for all i ∈ N \ B. We have
HEUπ◦v(y, x) = HEUv (y, x)−
∑
S∈B
DEUS  0.
Hence B ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT). All the elements of Ex that are strictly better than B are explored by Algorithm Algo-EU at
the previous steps. Since the algorithm did not terminate earlier, this means that there is no C ∈ Ex(x, y, v,EU,ψIVT) with
C discri B. Hence B is minimal in the sense of discri. The explanation set B is also minimal in the sense of  since discri
is a reﬁnement of . 
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof follows that of Proposition 9. In particular, from k, j ∈ S with k = j, we deﬁne π ′ . Hence
0< HMajπ ′◦v(y, x)− HMajπ◦v(y, x) = (vπ( j) − vπ(k))× (sgnk − sgn j).
One necessarily has sgnk = sgn j . Hence k and j cannot belong to the same set A+(y, x), A=(y, x) or A−(y, x). There is at
most one element of S in each of the three sets A+(y, x), A=(y, x) or A−(y, x). Hence |S| 3. The relations between vπ(k)
and vπ( j) in the statement of the proposition follow from the previous inequality. 
Proof of Proposition 12. We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 9. In particular, from k, j ∈ S with k = j, we deﬁne π ′ .
Let
a := hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (y) and b := hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x).
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 9, we obtain the relations y Pessπ ′◦v x and y Pessπ◦v x (see (16)). Hence
α1 := a∧
(
y j ∨ (1− vπ(k))
)∧ (yk ∨ (1− vπ( j)))
> b ∧ (x j ∨ (1− vπ(k)))∧ (xk ∨ (1− vπ( j)))=: β1,
α2 := a∧
(
y j ∨ (1− vπ( j))
)∧ (yk ∨ (1− vπ(k)))
 b ∧ (x j ∨ (1− vπ( j)))∧ (xk ∨ (1− vπ(k)))=: β2.
We are interested only to the case where k ∈ A+(y, x)∪ A=(y, x) and j ∈ A−(y, x). We have two cases.
The ﬁrst case is when 1 − vπ(k) > 1 − vπ( j) . The larger weight among vπ(k) and vπ( j) is assigned to the negative
argument, and the smaller one is assigned to the positive argument.
The second case is when 1− vπ(k)  1− vπ( j) . We proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5. We perform a sys-
tematic check of all possible cases of comparison between the variables {a,b, xk, x j, yk, y j,1− vπ( j),1− vπ(k)} to determine
whether some comparisons between some of these variables always hold. We obtain
xk  yk  hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x), hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x) < y j < x j,
1− vπ(k)  hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x), hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x) < hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (y),
hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (x) < 1− vπ( j). (17)
Let KS and J S be the sets of the indices k and j respectively, satisfying (17). Let us show that
∑
S∈A |KS | 1. Assume
by contradiction that there exist two pairs (k, j) and (k′, j′) in (A+(y, x) ∪ A=(y, x)) × A−(y, x) with (k, j) ∈ KS × J S
and (k′, j′) ∈ KS ′ × J S ′ (with S, S ′ ∈ A) satisfying (17), with k = k′ . From (17), yk ∨ (1 − vπ(k)) < hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (y). Since
k′ ∈ N \ { j,k}, we obtain hPess,N\{ j,k}π◦v (y) yk′ ∨ (1− vπ(k′)) and thus yk ∨ (1− vπ(k)) < yk′ ∨ (1− vπ(k′)). Similarly, we have
yk′ ∨ (1− vπ(k′)) < hPess,N\{ j
′,k′}
π◦v (y) yk ∨ (1− vπ(k)). Hence a contradiction is raised.
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that hPess, J Sπ◦v (x) = x j ∨ (1 − vπ( j)). Let i ∈ J S \ { j} such that hPess, J S\{ j}π◦v (x) = xi ∨ (1 − vπ(i)). From (17) applied on the pair
(k, j), we have xi ∨ (1− vπ(i)) = hPess,N\{k, j}π◦v (x) < 1− vπ( j) and thus
1− vπ(i) < 1− vπ( j).
From (17) applied on the pair (k, i), we have x j ∨ (1− vπ( j)) = hPess,N\{k,i}π◦v (x) < 1− vπ(i) and thus
1− vπ( j) < 1− vπ(i).
The previous two relations are clearly contradictory. Hence J S = N \ {k}.
Using previous argument, one can easily show in all cases that hPess,N\{k}π◦v (x) = xi ∨ (1− vπ(i)) for some i ∈ N \ ( J S ∪ {k}).
Hence
hPess,N\{k}π◦v (x) = hPess,N\( J S∪{k})π◦v (x).
Let S ∈ A. To sum-up, we have vπ( j) > vπ(i) if i ∈ (A+(y, x) ∪ A=(y, x)) \ KS and j ∈ A−(y, x), or if i ∈ KS and j ∈
A−(y, x) \ J S . Moreover, vπ( j)  vπ(i) if i ∈ KS and j ∈ J S . The weights assigned to the positive arguments are the smallest
ones, except for criterion KS :{
vπ(i): i ∈
(
A−(y, x)∩ S) \ J S}> {vπ(k): k ∈ KS} {vπ( j): j ∈ J S}
>
{
vπ(i): i ∈
((
A+(y, x)∪ A=(y, x))∩ S) \ KS}. 
10.4. Proofs of Section 7
Proof of Lemma 5. Clearly, for every z ∈ [0,1]n
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
hEUπ◦v(z) =
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
∑
k∈N
vk
)
zi =
n∑
i=1
1
n
zi = hEUwEU(z). 
Proof of Proposition 13. By deﬁnition of πN , for all permutations π ∈ Π(N),
HEUπN◦v(y, x) H
EU
π◦v(y, x). (18)
Hence from Lemma 5, HEU
wEU
(y, x)  1n!
∑
π∈Π(N) HEUπN◦v(y, x) = HEUπN◦v(y, x). Consequently, the ﬁrst part of the lemma is
proved.
The if part of the second part of the lemma is obvious. Let us show the only if part. Assume thus that HEUπN◦v(y, x) =
HEU
wEU
(y, x). From (18) and Lemma 5, the previous relation implies for every permutation π , HEUπN◦v(y, x) = HEUπ◦v(y, x). Thus
for every permutation π ∈ Π(N),
HEUv (y, x) = HEUπ◦v(y, x).
Let i = j in N , and π ∈ Π(N) the permutation permuting i and j and leaving the other elements of N . Previous relation
applied on π gives vii + v j j = v ji + vi j . Hence
(vi − v j)× (i − j) = 0. (19)
Assume that (7) holds. Let k ∈ N , and Ak = {i ∈ N, i = k}. Thus N \ Ak = ∅. For all i ∈ Ak and j ∈ N \ Ak , one has i =  j
and thus vi = v j by (19). We conclude that all vi have the same value. Since the weights are normalized, we obtained the
wished result. 
Proof of Proposition 14. Let
HEU1 := inf
x∈Rn, y∈Rn, v∈Rn+: v1+···+vn=1
HEU
wEU
(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)
maxπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HEUπ◦v(y, x)
.
Since HEUv (y, x) = hEUv (), we obtain
HEU1 = inf
∈Rn, v∈Rn+: v1+···+vn=1
hEU
wEU
()−minπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v()
maxπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v()−minπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v()
.
Let  ∈ Rn , and
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maxπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v()−minπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v()
,
β = −αmin
i∈N
i .
Let ′ := α+β . By deﬁnition of β , ′ ∈ Rn+ . Since hEUw is stable under aﬃne transformations (i.e. hEUw (α+β) = αhEUw ()+
β) [31], maxπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v(′)−minπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v(′) = 1. Hence
HEU1 = inf
∈Rn+, v∈Rn+: v1+···+vn=1,maxπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v ()−minπ∈Π(N) hEUπ◦v ()=1
(
hEUwEU()− minπ∈Π(N)h
EU
π◦v()
)
.
Without loss of generality, one can assume that
v1  · · · vn,
1  · · ·n.
Then by Lemma 3
min
π∈Π(N)h
EU
π◦v() =
n∑
i=1
vn−i+1i,
max
π∈Π(N)
hEUπ◦v() =
n∑
i=1
vii
and
HEU1 = inf
∈Rn+, v∈Rn+: v1···vn,1···n, v1+···+vn=1,
∑n
i=1(vi−vn−i+1)i=1
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
− vn−i+1
)
i .
From Assertions 1 and 2 below, HEU1 = 1n .
Assertion 1. For v ∈ W(EU) \ {wEU} such that v1  · · · vn,
inf
∈Rn+: 1···n,
∑n
i=1(vi−vn−i+1)i=1
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
− vn−i+1
)
i = min
k∈{2,...,n}
∑n
i=k( 1n − vn−i+1)∑n
i=k(vi − vn−i+1)
where the numerator and the denominator are positive.
Proof. Let
U =
{
 ∈ Rn, 01, 1 2, . . . , n−1 n and
n∑
i=1
(vi − vn−i+1)i = 1
}
.
From [16, Theorem 18.1],  is a vertex of U iff n − 1 inequalities among the n inequalities of U are transformed into
equalities. Let k ∈ {1, . . . ,n} be the index of the inequality that is not transformed into an equality. One cannot have k = 1
since
∑n
i=1(vi − vn−i+1) = 0. Hence k ∈ {2, . . . ,n}. Then 0= 1 = · · · = k−1 < k = · · · = n =: αk . One has
1=
n∑
i=1
(vi − vn−i+1)i = αk
n∑
i=k
(vi − vn−i+1).
From the normalization condition, we obtain
αk = 1∑n
i=k(vi − vn−i+1)
.
Hence the relation of the assertion is proved.
We have
hEUwEU()− minπ∈Π(N)h
EU
π◦v() =
n∑
i=k
(
1
n
− vn−i+1
)
,
max
π∈Π(N)
hEUπ◦v()− min
π∈Π(N)h
EU
π◦v() =
n∑
i=k
(vi − vn−i+1)
where  is deﬁned above. The signs of numerator and denominator follow from Proposition 13. 
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inf
v∈W(EU)\{wEU}: v1···vn
min
k∈{2,...,n}
∑n
i=k( 1n − vn−i+1)∑n
i=k(vi − vn−i+1)
= 1
n
.
Proof. Let HEU2 be the left hand side in the expression of the lemma. Then
HEU2 = inf
v∈Rn+: v1···vn, v1+···+vn=1
min
k∈{2,...,n}
∑n
i=k( 1n
∑
j∈N v j − vn−i+1)∑n
i=k(vi − vn−i+1)
.
We notice that the ratio is homogeneous in v in the previous relation. Hence constraint v1 + · · · + vn = 1 can be removed:
HEU2 = inf
v∈Rn+: v1···vn
min
k∈{2,...,n}
∑n
i=k( 1n
∑
j∈N v j − vn−i+1)∑n
i=k(vi − vn−i+1)
.
We are interested in v different from the arithmetic mean. From Lemma 1 the denominator is strictly positive in this case.
Hence one can arbitrarily set it to value 1:
HEU2 = inf
v∈Rn+: v1···vn,
∑n
i=k(vi−vn−i+1)=1
min
k∈{2,...,n}
n∑
i=k
(
1
n
∑
j∈N
v j − vn−i+1
)
.
One has
n∑
i=k
(vi − vn−i+1) =
n∑
i=k′
(vi − vn−i+1)
with k′ =max(k,n− k+ 1).
Let
U =
{
v ∈ Rn, 0 v1, v1  v2, . . . , vn−1  vn and
n∑
i=k′
(vi − vn−i+1) = 1
}
.
From [16, Theorem 18.1], v is a vertex of U iff n− 1 inequalities of U are transformed into equalities. Let p ∈ {1, . . . ,n} be
the index of the inequality that is not transformed into an equality. One cannot have p = 1 since, otherwise, the equality
constraint in U would not be satisﬁed. Hence p ∈ {2, . . . ,n}. Then 0= v1 = · · · = vp−1 < vp = · · · = vn =: αp . One has
n∑
i=k
(
1
n
∑
j∈N
v j − vn−i+1
)
=
n−k+1∑
i=1
(
n− p + 1
n
αp − vi
)
=: F .
There are two cases:
• p  n− k+ 1. Hence the functional F is
F = (n− p + 1)(n− k+ 1)
n
αp
where
1=
n∑
i=k′
(vi − vn−i+1) =
n∑
i=k′
vi =
(
n−max(p,k′)+ 1)× αp .
Hence F is always greater or equal to 1n . The minimal value
1
n is attained for p = k = n.• p < n− k+ 1. The functional F is
F = (n− p + 1)(n− k+ 1)
n
αp −
[
(n− k+ 1)− p + 1]αp
with
1=
n∑
i=k′
(vi − vn−i+1) =
(
n− k′ + 1)αp − [(n− k′ + 1)− p]αp = pαp .
Hence the functional is
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n
[
(n− p + 1)(n− k+ 1)− n(n− k− p + 2)]= p
n
[
(p − 1)k+ 1] 1
n
.
The minimal value is 1n . 
The proof of Proposition 14 is now completed. 
Proof of Proposition 15. Let λEU := HEUπN◦v(y, x)− HEUπN◦v(y, x). For every π,π ′ ∈ Π(N)∣∣HEUπ◦v(y, x)− HEUπ ′◦v(y, x)∣∣ λEU. (20)
Let i, i, j, j ∈ N such that mini∈N i = i , maxi∈N i = i , min j∈N v j = v j and max j∈N v j = v j . Deﬁne π,π ′ ∈ Π(N)
such that π(i) = j , π(i) = j , π ′(i) = j , π ′(i) = j and π(i) = π ′(i) for all i ∈ N \ {i, i}. From (20), we obtain∣∣(v ji + v ji )− (v ji + v ji )∣∣ λEU.
Hence
|v j − v j ||i −i | λEU.
By the deﬁnition of i and i , i −i = δ. This proves that
|v j − v j |
λEU
δ
.
By the deﬁnition of j and j , we have for all i, j ∈ N
|vi − v j| |v j − v j |
λEU
δ
.
Finally for any i ∈ N∣∣∣∣vi − 1n
∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣vi − 1n
∑
j∈N
v j
∣∣∣∣= 1n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈N\{i}
(v j − vi)
∣∣∣∣ n− 1n λ
EU
δ
.
By Proposition 14, λEU  nχEU. Hence the two inequalities in Proposition 15 are proved. These inequalities are reached with
x= (0, . . . ,0), y = (0, . . . ,0,1), v = (0, . . . ,0,1) since we obtain ν = n−1n , δ = 1, λEU = 1 and χEU = 1n . 
Proof of Lemma 6. One has
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
HMajπ◦v(y, x) =
∑
i∈A+(y,x)
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
vπ(i) −
∑
i∈A−(y,x)
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
vπ(i)
=
∑
i∈A+(y,x)
1
n
−
∑
i∈A−(y,x)
1
n
= HMaj
wMaj
(y, x). 
Proof of Proposition 16. For all π ∈ Π(N), HMajπ◦v(y, x) HMajπN◦v(y, x). Hence, by Lemma 6, HMajwMaj(y, x) H
Maj
πN◦v(y, x).
The if part of the second part of the lemma is obvious. Let us show the only if part. Assume thus that HMajπN◦v(y, x) =
HMaj
wMaj
(y, x). Then for all π ∈ Π(N), HMajπ◦v(y, x) HMajv (y, x). Let i = j in N , and let π be the permutation permuting i and
j and leaving the other criteria. We have
HMajv (y, x)− HMajπ◦v(y, x)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if i, j ∈ A+(y, x) or i, j ∈ A−(y, x) or i, j ∈ A=(y, x),
2(vi − v j) if i ∈ A+(y, x), j ∈ A−(y, x),
2(v j − vi) if i ∈ A−(y, x), j ∈ A+(y, x),
vi − v j if [i ∈ A+(y, x), j ∈ A=(y, x)] or [i ∈ A=(y, x), j ∈ A−(y, x)],
v j − vi if [i ∈ A=(y, x), j ∈ A+(y, x)] or [i ∈ A−(y, x), j ∈ A=(y, x)].
By (8), A+(y, x) ∪ A−(y, x) = ∅. If A+(y, x) = ∅, then we obtain vi = v j for all i ∈ A+(y, x) and all j ∈ A−(y, x) ∪ A=(y, x).
Hence vi = v j for all i, j ∈ N . Now if A−(y, x) = ∅, then we obtain vi = v j for all i ∈ A−(y, x) and all j ∈ A+(y, x)∪ A=(y, x).
Hence vi = v j for all i, j ∈ N . 
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HMaj := min
x,y: (8)
min
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
HMaj
wMaj
(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HMajπ◦v(y, x)
maxπ∈Π(N) HMajπ◦v(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HMajπ◦v(y, x)
.
One has that
max
x,y: (8)
max
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
max
π∈Π(N)
HMajπ◦v(y, x) = 1,
min
x,y: (8)
min
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
min
π∈Π(N) H
Maj
π◦v(y, x) = −1
are attained with v1 = 1 and vi = 0 for i = 1, and A+(y, x) = {1} (for the ﬁrst relation) and A−(y, x) = {1} (for the second
relation). Hence
max
x,y: (8)
max
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
(
max
π∈Π(N)
HMajπ◦v(y, x)− min
π∈Π(N) H
Maj
π◦v(y, x)
)
 2,
and
HMaj  1
2
min
x,y: (8)
min
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
(
HMaj
wMaj
(y, x)− min
π∈Π(N) H
Maj
π◦v(y, x)
)
.
Setting Lv(A+, A−) =∑i∈A+ vi −∑i∈A− vi , we have
HMaj  1
2
min
(A+,A−)∈Q(N): (8)
min
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj
(
LwMaj
(
A+, A−
)− min
π∈Π(N) Lπ◦v
(
A+, A−
))
where Q(N) = {(A+, A−) ∈ 2N × 2N : A+ ∩ A− = ∅}. Without loss of generality, one can assume that
v1  · · · vn,
A+ = {1, . . . , p} and A− = {q, . . . ,n}
where p < q are in {0, . . . ,n+ 1}. Then the following two relations hold
LwMaj
(
A+, A−
)= p − (n− q+ 1)
n
,
min
π∈Π(N) Lπ◦v
(
A+, A−
)= (v1 + · · · + vp)− (vq + · · · + vn).
Condition (8) becomes
p < q, p < n, q > 1 and [p  1 or q n]. (21)
Hence
HMaj  1
2
min
p,q: (21)
min
v∈W(Maj)\wMaj: v1···vn
F
where F := p−(n−q+1)n − [(v1 + · · · + vp)− (vq + · · · + vn)]. We write
HMaj  1
2
min
p,q: (21)
min
v: 0v1···vn and v1+···+vn=1
F .
Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 14, the minimum is necessarily attained on a vertex of the polytope
U =
{
v ∈ Rn, 0 v1  · · · vn and
n∑
i=1
vi = 1
}
.
A vector v ∈ U is a vertex of U iff there exists r ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that
v1 = · · · = vr−1 = 0, vr = · · · = vn =: α.
Since v is normalized, one has α = 1 . One has r  2 since v is different from wMaj. One hasn−r+1
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{
0 if p < r,
(p − r + 1)α if p  r,
vq + · · · + vn =
{
(n− q+ 1)α if q r,
(n− r + 1)α if q < r.
We have the following cases:
1. p < r, q r. We have
F = p − (n− q+ 1)
n
+ n− q+ 1
n− r + 1 =
p
n
+ (n− q+ 1)(r − 1)
n(n− r + 1) 
1
n(n− 1)
for p = 0, r = 2 and q = n.
2. p < r, q < r. We have
F = p − (n− q+ 1)
n
+ n− r + 1
n− r + 1 =
p + q− 1
n
 1
n
.
3. p  r, q r. We have
F = p − (n− q+ 1)
n
− (p − r + 1)− (n− q+ 1)
n− r + 1 =
(r − 1)(n− p − q+ 2)
n− r + 1 
1
n
.
4. p  r, q < r. This situation is impossible since q > r.
We have shown that
χMaj
maxπ∈Π(N) HMajπ◦v(y, x)−minπ∈Π(N) HMajπ◦v(y, x)
 θ := 1
2n(n− 1) .
Then |HMajπ◦v(y, x) − HMajπ ′◦v(y, x)|  χ
Maj
θ
for every π,π ′ ∈ Π(N). Let i, j ∈ N . Deﬁne π and π ′ as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 15. If i, j are not in the same set among A+(y, x), A−(y, x) and A=(y, x), then we obtain |vi − v j | χMajθ . Hence for
all i, j ∈ N , |vi − v j | 2χMajθ . Therefore∣∣∣∣vi − 1n
∣∣∣∣= 1n
∣∣∣∣∑
j =i
(v j − vi)
∣∣∣∣ n− 1n 2χ
Maj
θ
 2χ
Maj
θ
. 
For the proof of Proposition 18, we need the following result.
Lemma 7. Let p ∈ N and a,b ∈ Rp . If ai > bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then
p∧
i=1
ai >
p∧
i=1
bi .
Proof. By associativity of the operator ∧, it is enough to prove the lemma for p = 2. One has then a1 > b1  b1 ∧ b2 and
a2 > b2  b1 ∧ b2. Hence a1 ∧ a2 > b1 ∧ b2, which proves the result. 
Proof of Proposition 18. One has for any π ∈ Π(N)
n∧
i=1
(
yi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)
>
n∧
i=1
(
xi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)
.
By Lemma 7,
∧
π∈Π(N)
[
n∧
i=1
(
yi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)]
>
∧
π∈Π(N)
[
n∧
i=1
(
xi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)]
.
Hence
n∧[ ∧ (
yi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)]
>
n∧[ ∧ (
xi ∨ (1− vπ(i))
)]
i=1 π∈Π(N) i=1 π∈Π(N)
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n∧
i=1
[
n∧
j=1
(
yi ∨ (1− v j)
)]
>
n∧
i=1
[
n∧
j=1
(
yi ∨ (1− v j)
)]
.
Since there exists k such that vk = 1, one has
n∧
j=1
(
yi ∨ (1− v j)
)= yi .
This gives
n∧
i=1
yi >
n∧
i=1
xi . 
Proof of Proposition 19. Let t ∈ E with t > e. The cardinality of the set E is 2|A+(y, x)|+1. There are at most |A+(y, x)|−1
elements of E \ {1} greater than or equal to t . Hence∣∣{i ∈ A+(y, x): xi  t}∣∣+ ∣∣{i ∈ N: 1− vi  t}∣∣= ∣∣{α ∈ E \ {1}: α  t}∣∣< ∣∣A+(y, x)∣∣.
Therefore there does not exist π ∈ Π(N) such that
hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) t.
Hence (9) holds.
Only if part of the proposition: We assume that HPessπ◦v(y, x) > 0 for every π ∈ Π(N).
By the deﬁnition of A+(y, x), A=(y, x) and A−(y, x), we have hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (y)  hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x), h
Pess,A=(y,x)
π◦v (y) =
hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x) and h
Pess,A−(y,x)
π◦v (y)  hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (x). If we assume that hPessπ◦v(x) = hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (x) ∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x), then
hPessπ◦v(y) h
Pess,A−(y,x)
π◦v (y)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (y) hPessπ◦v(x), which contradicts HPessπ◦v(y, x) > 0. Hence
hPessπ◦v(x) = hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x),
hPessπ◦v(x) < h
Pess,A−(y,x)
π◦v (x)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x).
Hence (iii) holds. If we assume that hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (y) = hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x), then HPessπ◦v(y, x)  0 and a contradiction is raised.
Hence (i) holds.
Let L′ := {i ∈ A−(y, x)∪ A=(y, x): yi  e}. Assume by contradiction that L′ = ∅. Since v is normalized, there exists m ∈ N
such that vm = 1. Consider then π2 ∈ Π(N) such that π2 (k) =m for some k ∈ L′ , and π2 (i) = π vN ◦ (π xA+(y,x))−1(i) for all
i ∈ A+(y, x). In the permutation π2 , the largest values of 1− v are assigned to the smallest values of x and vice versa. More
precisely, for every i ∈ A+(y, x), either xi  e or 1− vπ2 (i)  e. Hence
max
π∈Π(N)
hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) = hPess,A
+(y,x)
π2◦v (x) = e.
Since π2 (k) =m for some k ∈ L′ , we have
hPess,A
−(y,x)
π2◦v (y)∧ h
Pess,A=(y,x)
π2◦v (y) e = h
Pess,A+(y,x)
π2◦v (x) = h
Pess
π2◦v(x).
This contradicts HPess
π2◦v(y, x) > 0. Hence L
′ = ∅.
If part of the proof: Assume that (i), (ii) and (iii) hold. Let π ∈ Π(N). Then hPess,A+(y,x)π◦v (y) > hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) = hPessπ◦v(x)
and e  hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) = hPessπ◦v(x) (by (9) and (iii)). By (ii), hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (y)∧hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (y) > e. Hence hPessπ◦v(y) > hPessπ◦v(x). 
Proof of Proposition 20. Assume that either Vi+ = ∅ or (10) holds. Let π ∈ Π(N). When π(i+) /∈ Vi+ , we have
hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (y) = yi+ > xi+ ∨ (1− vπ(i+)) hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) since yi+ > xi+ and yi+ > 1− vπ(i+) .
Suppose now that π(i+) ∈ Vi+ (hence Vi+ = ∅). Then, by (10),
Lπ :=
{
j ∈ A+(y, x): x j < 1− vk+ and 1− vπ( j) < yi+
} = ∅.
For all j ∈ Lπ , 1− vπ( j) < yi+  y j and thus y j∨(1− vπ( j)) = y j > x j∨(1− vπ( j)). Moreover, for all j ∈ Lπ , x j∨(1− vπ( j)) <
1− vk+ since x j < 1− vk+ and 1− vπ( j) < yi+  1− vk+ . Hence
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On the other hand, for all j ∈ A+(y, x) \ Lπ , either y j > x j  1 − vk+ or 1 − vπ( j)  yi+ (and thus 1 − vπ( j)  1 − vk+ ).
Hence hPess,A
+(y,x)\Lπ
π◦v (y) 1− vk+ and
hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (y) (1− vk+)∧ hPess,Lππ◦v (y) > hPess,Lππ◦v (x) hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x).
Conversely, assume that Vi+ = ∅ and that (10) is not satisﬁed. We have i+ ∈ L := { j ∈ A+(y, x): x j < 1 − vk+} since
xi+ < yi+  1− vk+ . Since |Vi+| |L|, there exists π1 ∈ Π(N), such that π1 (i+) = k+ and for all i ∈ L, 1− vπ1 (i)  yi+ (and
thus 1− vπ1 (i)  1− vk+ ). Since π1 (i+) = k+ , h
Pess,L
π1◦v (y) = 1− vk+ and h
Pess,L
π1◦v (x) = 1− vk+ . Since yi > xi  1− vk+ for all i ∈
A+(y, x) \ L, we have hPess,A+(y,x)\L
π1◦v (y) 1− vk+ and h
Pess,A+(y,x)\L
π1◦v (x) 1− vk+ . Hence h
Pess,A+(y,x)
π1◦v (y) = h
Pess,A+(y,x)
π1◦v (x). 
Proof of Proposition 21.
• Assume that I = ∅. Since v is normalized, there exists m ∈ N such that vm = 1. Let π3 ∈ Π(N) such that π3 ( j+) =m.
Since
∧
i∈N xi = x j+ , we get hPessπ3◦v(x) = x j+ , which contradicts (11).• Assume that I = ∅ but |{k ∈ N: 1− vk  x j+}| |I|. Then there exists π4 ∈ Π(N) such that for all i ∈ I , 1− vπ4 (i)  x j+
and π4 ( j
+) =m. We obtain hPess,A+(y,x)
π4◦v (x) x j+ and h
Pess,A−(y,x)
π4◦v (x)∧ h
Pess,A=(y,x)
π4◦v (x) = x j+ . This contradicts (11).
• Assume that (12) holds. Then for all π ∈ Π(N), there exists i ∈ I such that 1 − vπ(i) < x j+ . Hence hPess,A
+(y,x)
π◦v (x) 
xi ∨ (1− vπ(i)) < x j+ and hPess,A
−(y,x)
π◦v (x)∧ hPess,A
=(y,x)
π◦v (x) x j+ . Hence (11) holds. 
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